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ABSTRACT
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) justifies its power and regulatory
structure as necessary to promote competitive balance. Despite this, there is limited research on
the efficacy of NCAA policies that were implemented with the intention of supporting more
parity in Division I conferences.
This study examined whether the 2015 cost of attendance (COA) policy was associated
with competitive balance in various groups within the Division I Football Bowl Subdivision.
Through the lenses of the Matthew Effect and policy design theory, this study aimed to
understand how NCAA policies may hurt or help inequality in college sport.
Although not all findings were significant, meaningful conclusions were drawn from
observing the differences between Power 5 and Group of Five conferences, as well as between
men’s and women’s sports. This descriptive study found that COA had little effect on
competitive balance; rather, it may have only served to further perpetuate the college athletics
arms race and inequality in the NCAA.
Keywords: Competitive balance, cost of attendance, NCAA policy, cumulative
inequality, college athletics arms race
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In 2015, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) adopted the Autonomy
Model, which provided the 65 largest intercollegiate athletic programs, collectively known as the
“Power 5,” the ability to propose, vote on, adopt, and implement policies related to studentathlete success and wellness. This groundbreaking step was taken because this group of schools,
who hold tremendous amounts of power, prestige, and wealth, were growing increasingly
frustrated by the inability to enact policy because less-resourced schools often rejected anything
that might not be feasible to them (Knight Commission, 2020; Weaver, 2015). Essentially, with
the new autonomy model, the most resourced athletic programs in the country were granted the
power to design policy that affects all other schools in Division I, the most competitive division
within the NCAA. The first policy introduced by the autonomous schools was Cost of
Attendance (COA), which for the first time in decades increased the upper limits of studentathlete compensation. This study considered previous research and emerging data reflecting the
relationship between the introduction of the COA policy and competitive balance in college
athletics. Data from publicly available websites were used to calculate the Margin of Victory
Ratio (MVR) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), both accepted competitive balance
measures previously established in the literature. Nine conferences were studied over a period of
12 years (2008-2020) to determine whether there was a significant relationship between COA
and competitive balance.
Background
In the United States, college athletics holds a cultural significance that has led to the
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evolution of a multi-billion-dollar industry. Inevitably, competition plays a central role as athletic
programs face off against one another in pursuit of championships, honor, and prestige. Sport
fans in the United States, the only country with this level of organized intercollegiate athletic
competition, value fairness, equality, and integrity through unambiguous rules that are
collectively agreed upon (Abrams, 2013; Tauer, 2010). These values encouraged the
establishment of the NCAA in the early 20th century to create a unified governing body,
standardize playing rules and department operations, and maintain the amateur spirit of college
athletics while aligning with the educational missions of member institutions. NCAA policy and
organizational structures aimed at improving equity in college athletics have limited spending in
various areas and altered the distribution of resources between conferences and institutions in an
attempt to create more competitively balanced programs and conferences (NCAA, 2021). These
same policies, however, may contribute to structures that sustain imbalance in intercollegiate
athletics, with a small subset of programs holding distinct competitive advantages and levels of
unmatched power and prestige.
NCAA Structure and Governance
West Point alumnus Captain Palmer E. Pierce, the NCAA’s first elected president serving
from 1906 through 1930, had a vision of the NCAA regulating all aspects of intercollegiate
athletics (Duderstadt, 2009). Early on, the NCAA was a relatively weak governing body due to
low academic institution membership and a lack of prestige (Sherman, 2008). By the mid-20th
century, to gain more power and prestige, the NCAA began to horizontally integrate the business
of intercollegiate athletics and did so by moving into the sponsorship of championship events in
multiple sports, increasing member dependency on the association. In doing so, Stern (1979)
states that “the NCAA was transformed from a loose voluntary confederation of universities into
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the dominant control agent over college athletics during the period from 1906, when it was
organized, to 1952, when member schools granted it regulatory power” (p. 242).
Women’s Sport and the NCAA
Throughout the early to mid-20th century, both scholars and practitioners argued that
men’s and women’s intercollegiate athletics should remain under sex-separate control
(Wushanley, 2004). Women, especially women-led sport organizations and physical education
teachers, were the decision-makers for their sports at all levels and designed policies and
regulations with women’s interests in mind (Cain, 2000). As women’s sport grew in popularity
in the 1960s, so too did interest in shifting from student-led intramural sport events to more
formalized faculty-controlled governance as well as interest from the NCAA to take control. The
growing commercialization of college football and men’s basketball showed the profitability of
college sport and by the late 1970s, the NCAA began to realize that there was a potential to gain
revenue from women’s sport as well, particularly women’s basketball.
The Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) was founded in 1971 to
formally govern collegiate women’s athletics and organize their national championships.
Collegiate women’s athletics faced a significant change in organizational structure and
governance after the passage of Title IX of the Educational Amendments just one year later in
1972 requiring equal educational opportunity and fair financial aid distribution for men and
women in federally funded educational programs (Carpenter & Acosta, 2005). In the years that
followed, the NCAA moved to adopt women’s college sport programs but the AIAW fought to
maintain its existence as their governing body, arguing that women’s sport required a
fundamentally different model than men’s and that a governing body created for and by women,
compared to the NCAA that was created for and by men, was necessary to protect the rights of
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female student-athletes and coaches (Jackson, 2015). The AIAW lost a lawsuit filed against the
NCAA claiming antitrust violations in 1981. In 1982, the NCAA won control over the Division I
Women’s Basketball tournament and NBC canceled its television contract with the AIAW,
marking the beginning of full integration of women’s sport into the NCAA (Osborne et. al,
2020). Despite efforts to promote gender equity in college sport, the majority of college athletic
programs are still not in compliance with Title IX (Baker, 2015) and continue to discriminate
against and underfund women in sport (Champion Women, 2021).
The NCAA today
Today, the NCAA has significant control over 1,200 member institutions that sponsor
both men’s and women’s varsity sports. NCAA member institutions are divided into three major
divisions: Division I (DI), Division II (DII), and Division III (DIII). Each division has a unique
governance structure and is able to set its own policies related to scholarship limits and number
of coaches per sport (Zimbalist, 2013). For instance, Division I football is allowed 85 full
scholarships while Division II football is allowed 36 (NCAA, 2019). Division III does not
provide any athletically-related financial aid. Division I football is the only NCAA sport that has
subdivisions within conferences: the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), which houses the most
competitive football programs, and the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS). Divisions are
further broken down into conferences with 10 or 12 schools predominantly based on prestige and
geographic region in order to organize competition schedules (Dennie, 2011).
Power 5 Autonomy Model
The power and prestige held by the Power 5 conferences allowed them to accumulate
unmatched levels of tangible and intangible resources throughout the years. Varying levels of
money and prestige lead institutions to operate with different sets of missions, goals, and
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strategic plans. Elite athletic programs have been under increasing pressure to improve
competitive aspects (i.e., facilities, head coaching salaries, student-athlete services) of their
programs while less-elite programs have struggled to financially stay in the game (Cheslock &
Knight, 2015). The informal power held by the Power 5 due to their financial superiority was
formally recognized and legitimized in 2014 when the NCAA Division I Board of Directors
voted on and passed the new autonomy model that provided the Power 5’s member institutions
the ability to propose, vote on, and implement new policies that affect all other DI programs who
are unable to vote against them. The Power 5 fought for autonomy because they wanted to be
able to support their student-athletes with policy changes that were previously rejected by other
schools and do so through a more streamlined process where they are able to control the
policymaking process from beginning to end (Knight Commission, 2020). Non-P5 DI schools
are able to opt-in or opt-out of these policies as they see fit; however, they hold no power in how
policies are formed. Although non-Power 5 schools are unable to easily adopt some policies due
to financial concerns, they likely feel pressure to adopt them anyway to attempt to compete for
resources and maintain a level of legitimacy and competitiveness. This power differential
perpetuates over a century of financial inequality in intercollegiate athletics which has led to
competitive inequality within NCAA divisions (Lawrence, 2013). The autonomy model provided
the richest schools formal power to write the rules for everyone and established an additional
structure that helps keep them at the top.
Cost of Attendance (2015)
Responding to national stories highlighting struggling student-athletes (Fowler, 2014;
Glier, 2014; McNamara, 2014; Sherman, 2014), as well as a 2014 class-action antitrust lawsuit
claiming that student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses (NIL) were being exploited for
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profit (O'Bannon v. NCAA, 2014), the Power 5, with their newly granted autonomy, proposed
Cost of Attendance (COA) at the 2015 NCAA Convention, which was adopted and applied
beginning in the 2015-16 academic year. The policy allows institutions to provide a modest
living stipend per academic year, the first time direct student-athlete compensation limits
increased since the establishment of grant-in-aid (GIA) in 1956 (NCAA, 2015). The stipend
varies by school, ranging from $2,000-5,000 per academic year, and institutions have discretion
as to which sports programs receive the benefit. Because direct payments to student-athletes (i.e.,
GIA scholarships) have upper limits, this additional compensation provides prospective studentathletes an easily comparable factor to consider when selecting their program, potentially
disrupting balance by affecting recruiting rankings. Bradbury and Pitts (2015) found that every
$230-483 increase in the cost of attendance stipend was associated with a one-spot improvement
in recruiting ranking for DI FBS college football programs.
These dollars help student-athletes close the gap between a university’s published costof-attendance and the full cost of attending college, which includes the “rudimentary expenses
related to being a student,” including items such as transportation, childcare, and other expenses
in addition to tuition, fees, textbooks, room, and board (Tutka & Williams, 2017, p. 245). NCAA
Bylaw 15.02.2.1 states that athletic programs must calculate the full cost of attendance using the
same policies and procedures that are used to calculate the cost of attendance for all general
students. The additional financial burden of COA stipends weighs more heavily on non-P5
schools, many of whom were unsupportive of the policy from the start. Power 5 schools pushed
for COA because of public pressures regarding inequitable distribution of revenues to coaches
and student-athletes (Cheslock & Knight, 2015). While a few thousand extra dollars per year
does not quite make up the difference between student-athlete compensation and multi-million-
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dollar head coaching salaries, it does signal a continued commitment to student-athlete wellbeing.
While schools are able to opt-in or opt-out of the policy, the change in definition of a full
scholarship affected every DI school and student-athlete. Under the previous full grant-in-aid
(FGIA) calculation, a full scholarship included the sum of tuition and fees, room and board, and
required course-related books. The new full cost of attendance (FCOA) calculation adds other
expenses to this calculation. It is important to note that schools are able to opt-in to COA for
certain sports and not others; however, they must remain compliant with Title IX’s scholarship
requirements (Buzuvis, 2015). For instance, a school might opt into COA for only men’s and
women’s basketball, which both offer the same number of full scholarships to their studentathletes; this makes it easier to offset scholarships for men’s basketball. It is more challenging if
a school opts in for football; the 85 full scholarships provided in that one men’s sport must be
offset by opting into COA for an equivalent number of women’s sports scholarships, typically at
least two of the following: soccer, volleyball, or gymnastics to comply with Title IX For studentathletes that receive a fraction of a full scholarship, the percentage of a full scholarship they
receive is now determined with the amount they receive as the numerator and FCOA, rather than
full grant-in-aid (FGIA), as the denominator. As an example, an FGIA calculation for a full
scholarship might equal $50,000 while a FCOA calculation equals $55,000. In this case, the
COA stipend would be $5,000.
Competitive inequality
Competitive imbalance within and across NCAA conferences represents competitive
inequality in college sport. Built off Rottenberg’s (1956) uncertainty of outcome hypothesis
(UOH), the idea of competitive balance in sport reflects an even distribution of playing talent,
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resources, expenditures, and overall competitive equity as measured by playing strength among
teams and the rational expectations of fans about the outcomes of sporting events (Vrooman,
2009; Sanderson & Siegfried, 2003; Szymanski, 2001; Eckard, 1998). In traditional product
markets, a monopolistic share of the market is a desirable position for a firm; in sport, when one
team holds the majority share of the wins within a league, it could hurt the financial wellbeing of
the league and all its players. Predictable leagues and matchups (i.e., consistent blowouts,
runaway champions, dynasties) decrease the perceived value of the product (i.e., the game)
because viewers need some degree of uncertainty as to who will win (Salaga, 2015; Levin &
Bailey, 2012; Sutter & Winkler, 2003).
Competitively balanced leagues and matchups, on the other hand, contribute to increased
demand and fan interest, both of which are crucial to and contribute to increased ticket sales,
media rights deals, university alumni giving, prestige, and more (Salaga & Fort, 2016; Lawrence,
2013; Humphreys, 2002; Vrooman, 1995) in what Neale (1964) describes as the League
Standing Effect. Previous scholars have argued that competitively balanced games and leagues
lead to the greatest attendance, revenue, and excitement; therefore, policy should focus on
balancing both the series of games in a season that lead to the championship and also attempt to
evenly distribute players to make each individual game an exciting matchup (Levin & Bailey,
2012; Dobson & Goddard, 2001; Whitney, 1988). A perfectly balanced individual game begins
with a completely uncertain outcome of winning for each participant and a perfectly balanced
league begins each season with each team having an equal chance of emerging as the champion
(Szymanski, 2001).
Previous research on the relationship between NCAA policy and organizational structure
(i.e., changes in scholarship limits, broadcasting regulations, revenue distributions) and
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competitive balance in college athletics has focused almost exclusively on the highest level of
football and men’s basketball across major conferences (Mills & Winfree, 2018; Salaga, 2015;
Sutter & Winkler, 2003; Eckard, 1998). Balance was found to be “remarkably stable” (p. 28)
over time in college football across Power 5 conferences despite significant regulation changes
such as GIA in 1956 and telecast deregulation in 1984 (Salaga & Fort, 2016). Significant
changes in parity, however, have been found within individual Power 5 conferences around
events (Salaga, 2015). Limited research has examined changes within individual conferences
outside the Power 5.
Studies looking to understand changes in competitive balance in other NCAA varsity
sports have been few and far between. Specifically, there is little to no research examining how
NCAA policies and structures impact performance outcomes in women's collegiate sports. Title
IX of the Educational Amendments in 1972 required schools to provide equal opportunity for
male and female student-athletes, prompting NCAA athletic departments to adopt women’s sport
programs into their existing model (Edwards, 2010). As a result, policies related to funding,
financial aid, facilities, practice time, and more apply to both men’s and women’s programs in an
effort to provide equitable opportunities and experiences. Limited research has examined how
these policies and structures designed with football and men’s basketball in mind affect their
women’s sport counterparts. Because of its applicability to all Division I FBS programs, COA
provides an opportunity to examine how NCAA policy and structure affects competitive balance
in multiple sports and how pressures to spend more to keep up with the Power 5 may amplify
imbalance in college sport.
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Theoretical Frameworks
The Matthew Effect
The notion of power plays a strong role in how and why NCAA policy is shaped because
the 65 autonomous schools are able to create policy with only their own interests in mind. The
policies that these schools create affect all Division I schools; in addition, these policies also
affect non-P5 and women’s programs whose needs are often overlooked completely. The
Matthew Effect and the concept of cumulative advantage was examined as a theoretical
framework for this study. Merton (1968; 1988) introduced the Matthew Effect to describe the
cumulative effects of prestige and resources on inequality in that early success compounds over
time to develop structures and create feedback loops that further reinforce inequality. Cumulative
inequality in higher education exists because the perceived benefits and rewards associated with
prestige are difficult to resist. Early success leads to the development of systemic structures, both
tangible (i.e., facilities) and intangible (i.e., reputation), that, over the years, provide athletic
programs opportunities to continuously leverage their successes and brands into more valuable
sponsorships, development dollars, human capital, and prestige (Lawrence, 2013). Applied to
college athletics, initial relative advantage in college sport created prestigious athletic programs,
and the cumulative effect of this advantage developed organizational and power structures that
continue to perpetuate institutional hierarchy and imbalance over time (Sesate, 2015). Because
many universities view their athletic programs as vehicles for increased overall institutional
success and prestige, they allocate substantial resources toward their revenue-generating sports,
often at the expense of other programs on campus, to enhance the public perception of their
institution.
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While these increased expenditures at Power 5 institutions have been met with increased
revenues, the same may not be true at Group of Five (G5) institutions, and the cumulative effect
of these ever-growing expenditures by more resourced programs prompts less-resourced
programs to attempt to keep up with P5 programs, leading to P5 cumulative advantage and
power. The Knight Commission (2020) found that leaders at DI institutions are concerned about
the growing inequality in college athletics, with 79% of survey respondents stating that the
disparity in financial resources is a serious concern. The Matthew Effect suggests that the
autonomy model is a structure that allows the Power 5 schools to introduce policies that further
escalate expenditures and, while G5 schools have the option to opt out of these policies, G5
schools feel the pressure to opt in to remain competitive with P5 schools even if they have little
to gain. This drives up spending levels for everyone, strains the budgets of less-resourced
programs, and creates positive feedback loops that perpetuate inequality in the NCAA.
Policy Design Theory
Policy design theory (PDT) is a framework that will guide this study to understand the
broader consequences of the COA policy. PDT suggests that positively constructed groups gain
political power over the policy making process and are able to design policies to efficiently and
effectively maintain their advantaged status over others (Schneider & Sidney, 2009; Schneider &
Ingram, 1992). Men’s revenue-generating sports that compete in the Power 5 conferences are
viewed as valuable and NCAA policies are often designed with this group in mind; however,
these same policies are broadly implemented and may affect other sports and conferences. Little
to no research has applied PDT to NCAA policy analysis despite the fact that many policies that
affect spending are largely targeted to a small subset of athletic programs within a small subset
of conferences. In the case of COA, the policy was implemented within the NCAA autonomy
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model as well as Title IX, making it applicable to all Division I conferences and requiring an
equitable implementation in women’s sports. As spending levels are vastly different between the
P5 and G5, and the needs of women’s sports are generally not at the forefront of policy decisionmaking in the NCAA, PDT would suggest that negatively constructed groups might experience
different changes in competitive balance compared to positively associated groups following
COA implementation.
Statement of the Problem
As the cost of college athletics continues to rise to unprecedented levels, barriers to entry
for less elite athletic programs to remain competitive are increasingly impenetrable. Even within
the most elite and competitive tier of Division I (DI), the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), there
is a considerable wealth gap, nearing over $200 million, between athletic programs (CAFI,
2019). Inequality has been present in college athletics for over a century, and the highest rewards
continue to remain concentrated among a small number of elite, historically successful athletic
programs. Athletic programs that achieve success build off of that success, creating a selfreinforcing, positive feedback loop where advantages compound over time (Cheslock & Knight,
2015). A winning season produces higher revenues, which leads to facility and coaching
investments, which attract better recruits, who win more games, which leads to more revenue
from more sources, and so on. Lawrence (2013) states that “the result of over 100 years of
financial inequality in intercollegiate athletics is competitive inequality within NCAA divisions
and a structure that guarantees inequality will continue in the future” (p. 26).
Designed for and by the most elite male college athletic programs, the 2015 Cost of
Attendance (COA) policy increased the upper limit of direct payments that student-athletes are
able to receive from their athletic programs for the first time in decades and did so during a time
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when there was heightened conversation around “hungry” student-athletes (Fowler, 2014) as
well as the exploitation of their name, image, and likeness (NIL) (O'Bannon v. NCAA, 2014).
The associated cost with COA implementation among DI FBS was upwards of over $1 million
dollars per year (Soloman, 2015), which altered the distribution of revenue within athletic
departments (Ngo, Coyner, & Lough, 2022). The optional nature of the policy provided Group of
Five conferences and their member institutions with the opportunity to opt out of increased
spending; however, they all chose to opt in, potentially altering the balance of overall and withinconference competition.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the COA policy and
competitive balance in Division I FBS conferences in the following sports: Football, Men’s
Basketball, Women’s Basketball, Women’s Soccer, and Women’s Volleyball. The relationship
between policy and competitive balance has been explored in previous studies; however, the
majority of these studies focus on men’s revenue sports in Power 5 conferences. Few studies
have looked at trends in parity following policy changes at non-Power 5 schools and nonrevenue-generating sports, including women’s sports.
Research Questions
This study was guided by the following research questions:
1. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with
changes in competitive balance in NCAA Division I FBS conferences?
2. To what extent were changes in competitive balance pre-COA and post-COA
different between the Power 5 and Group of Five?
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3. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with
changes in competitive balance in the following NCAA Division I FBS football,
men’s basketball, women’s basketball, women’s volleyball, and women’s soccer?
4. To what extent do changes in competitive balance pre-COA and post-COA differ
within each sport between the Power 5 and Group of Five?
5. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with
differences in competitive balance between men’s and women’s sports, and did
this vary by Power 5 or Group of Five affiliation?
6. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with
differences in competitive balance between men’s and women’s basketball, and
did this vary by Power 5 or Group of Five affiliation?
Overview of Methodology
This descriptive quantitative study was designed to examine the relationship between the
COA policy and competitive balance in nine conferences belonging to the Division I Football
Bowl Subdivision between the 2008-2020 intercollegiate athletic seasons for the following
sports: football, men’s basketball, women’s basketball, soccer, and volleyball. Interrupted time
series (ITS) analysis was used to examine level and trend changes in two competitive balance
measures, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of winning percentages and the Margin of
Victory Ratio (MVR), before and after COA. ITS is a commonly used design for evaluating the
effectiveness of interventions with clearly defined pre- and post- intervention periods when a
randomized control trial (RCT) is not possible (Bernal et al., 2017). In a single time series
analysis, a time series of an outcome of interest is used to understand an underlying trend which
is then interrupted by an intervention. The time series is divided into two segments and

14

segmented regression is used to statistically measure and compare the level and slope changes in
the pre- and post-intervention periods (Penfold & Zhang, 2013). In addition, the time series
allows researchers to estimate the counterfactual, or the trend that would have continued in the
absence of the intervention. Because COA was introduced in all DI FBS conferences at the same
time, an ITS design is appropriate to examine changes, if any, in competitive balance before and
after the introduction of the COA policy in DI FBS in 2015 using COA as the intervention.
Data Sources
All data collected and calculated for this study came from secondary sources.
Performance data for football and men’s basketball, including points scored per game, win
percentages, and conference champions, were collected from https://www.sports-reference.com.
Similar data points for women’s basketball, soccer, and volleyball were collected from
https://web1.ncaa.org/stats/StatsSrv/careersearch.
Data Collection and Analysis
Competitive balance metrics
There is no single metric that is agreed upon in the literature as the most appropriate
measure of balance in sport; however, three categories of competitive balance have emerged
from empirical studies: game uncertainty (GU), playoff uncertainty (PU), and consecutiveseason uncertainty (CSU) (Salaga, 2015; Bennett & Fizel, 1995; Cairns, 1987; Sloane, 1976).
Previous research on competitive balance in sport has used a number of measures for
determining parity for each category. PU is more informative and applicable to professional sport
leagues because of the limited number of teams and playoff structure. In college athletics,
however, there are a myriad of factors determining whether or not a team makes the playoffs,
including tie-ins for football bowl games, conference restructuring, and whether or not a playoff

15

even exists for a particular sport. Therefore, this study focused on GU and CSU using the
following measures: Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) of within-conference winning percentages. These variables will be described in further
detail in Chapter 3.
Limitations of the Study
There were a number of limitations to this study. First, for Division I schools outside the
Power 5, COA was an optional policy and schools had the discretion to choose whether and
when to adopt it as well as in which sports to implement it in. Although some FBS schools did
not adopt the policy immediately, there was an intent to adopt and in each conference over half
the schools adopted the first academic year (2015-16) they were able to, with all FBS schools
opting-in by the second year (2016-17) (Ngo et al., 2022). There is limited information on which
men’s and women’s sports each athletic program opted into; however, this study included the
sports that were most likely to receive the additional COA benefit. This study also focused on
competitive balance in a short and limited time frame before and after COA adoption within a
specific subgroup of NCAA Division I schools. In addition, changes in competitive balance may
be due to external factors that are outside the scope of this study; therefore, the findings of this
study are not causal but rather describe the relationship between COA and competitive balance.
Delimitations
The autonomy model provided the Power 5 institutions the ability to create policy that
only affects schools that compete in Division I; therefore, the study did include schools that
compete in NCAA Divisions II or III. Furthermore, the study was delimited to Division I schools
that compete within the Football Subdivision (FBS) because this subgroup of schools have
similar organizational characteristics, goals, and missions and compete at the highest level in all
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varsity sports, not just football. Schools that compete in Division I but in the Football
Championship Subdivision (FCS) and those that do not field a football team were not included in
this study. One DI FBS conference, the American Athletic Conference (AAC), a Group of Five
member, was omitted from the analysis because the conference was formed in 2013, only two
years prior to the introduction of COA. Schools that moved to the AAC in 2013 were members
of other DI FBS conferences (i.e., Conference USA) prior to 2013 and conference realignment
across multiple DI FBS conferences happened in this year; therefore, this study controls for the
number of members in each conference.
While COA had the potential to increase stipends for all varsity sports, each individual
athletic program chose which sports they wanted to provide the additional stipends to. Because
there is limited information on which sports each school applied COA to, this study focused on
the two men’s sports that the policy targeted, football and men’s basketball, as well as three
women’s sports that were most likely to have helped to offset the men’s sports with respect to
Title IX’s scholarship requirements: women’s basketball, soccer, and volleyball. Gymnastics was
not included in this analysis because, while some schools might have included gymnastics to
offset men’s COA stipends, not every athletic program in the FBS sponsors the sport and the
unique scoring in gymnastics is difficult to compare to other sports. Finally, in order to
understand how competitive balance was affected within each conference, the data analyzed in
this study were delimited to only conference games. Games played within a season that are
between two teams from different conferences were excluded from this analysis.
Significance of the Study
The results of this study may have implications for both researchers and practitioners
working in college athletically-related fields. There is limited research examining competitive
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balance in college athletics and virtually no research on competitive balance in sports outside
football and men’s basketball. Notably, limited research looks at the power dynamics within the
NCAA and how policies designed by and for the most prestigious football and men’s basketball
programs affect other athletic programs and sports within Division I.
Definitions of Terms
● Autonomy Model: The autonomy model refers to the structural change adopted by the
NCAA in 2015 that provides the 65 institutions with membership in the Power 5 the
ability to propose, vote on, and adopt legislation that applies to all Division I schools
(Knight Commission, 2020).
● Autonomous Schools: The autonomous schools are the 65 institutions with membership
in the following five “Power 5” conferences: Southeastern Conference (SEC), Big 10,
Big 12, Pacific-12 Conference (Pac-12), Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) (Lawrence,
2013).
● College Football Association (CFA): The CFA was created in 1976 to lobby on behalf of
the interests of the 62 largest football programs (Mawson & Bowler, 1989). This was one
of the first coalitions formed as a result of increasing power, prestige, and resources in
college athletics. Today’s Power 5 is composed largely of former CFA members.
● Competitive balance: Competitive balance in sport reflects an even distribution of
playing talent, resources, expenditures, and overall competitive equity as measured by
strength among teams and the expectations of fans about the outcomes of sporting events
(Vrooman, 2009; Sanderson & Siegfried, 2003; Szymanski, 2001; Eckard, 1998).
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● Conference: NCAA conferences are groups of 10-12 schools within a division that
regularly compete against one another and receive predetermined shares of conference
revenues. Conferences are determined based largely on prestige and geographic region.
● Conference Affiliation: The conference that a member institution belongs to.
● Consecutive season uncertainty (CSU): CSU is a way of measuring competitive balance
across seasons in that each competing member of a conference has an equal chance of
emerging as champion each year (Sloane, 1976). This study will measure CSU using the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of winning percentages.
● Cost of Attendance (COA): A 2015 NCAA policy that allowed Division I schools the
ability to provide additional compensation to student-athletes beyond their grants-in-aid
up to the full cost of attendance to attend their university (NCAA, 2015). For this study,
COA was used as the intervention in the time series model to understand competitive
balance before and after the policy change.
● Divisions: Divisions are different levels of collegiate competition in the NCAA. There
are three divisions: Division I, Division II, and Division III. Division I competes at the
highest level (NCAA.org).
● Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS): Within Division I football, there are two subdivisions.
The FBS competes at the highest level of football. Athletic programs with FBS
membership also compete at the highest level of all sports. FBS members have specific
requirements for all sports, including the number of varsity sports offered, scholarship
limits, and so forth. Football seasons in the FBS end with a series of bowl games
(NCAA.org).
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● Football Champion Subdivision (FCS): The FCS is the second subdivision of Division I
football. Football seasons in the FCS end with a championship (NCAA, 2021).
● Game uncertainty (GU): The uncertainty of which opponent will win an individual game
(Bennett & Fizel, 1995). A perfectly balanced individual game begins with a completely
uncertain outcome of winning for each participant. In this study, GU was operationalized
using the Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR).
● Group of Five: The Group of Five consists of the five FBS conferences that are not in the
Power 5. These conferences compete at the highest level of all sports in Division I:
Mountain West, Conference USA, Mid-American Conference (MAC), American Athletic
Conference (AAC), and Sun Belt Conference.
● Interrupted time series (ITS): ITS is a commonly used design for evaluating the
effectiveness of interventions with clearly defined pre- and post- intervention periods
when a randomized control trial (RCT) is not possible (Bernal et al., 2017). In this study,
COA was the intervention and competitive balance was observed before and after COA.
● National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA): The NCAA is a non-profit
organization whose purpose is to “enhance the integrity of higher education and to
promote civility in society, student-athletes, coaches, and all others associated with these
athletics programs and events should adhere to such fundamental values as respect,
fairness, civility, honesty and responsibility” (NCAA, 2021, p. 2). The NCAA makes
decisions that affect student-athlete wellbeing, revenue distribution, conference
championships, and more.
● Parity: Synonym of competitive balance. These two terms will be used interchangeably
throughout this document.
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● Power 5: The Power 5 consists of the five Division I FBS conferences with the 65 largest
and most resourced intercollegiate athletic programs, many of which were former
members of the CFA. These schools were granted the autonomy to create policy in the
2015 Autonomy Model and introduced COA that same year (Weaver, 2015). This group
of institutions is widely considered to be the “haves” in college athletics. The Power 5
includes the following conferences: Southeastern Conference (SEC), Big 10, Big 12,
Pacific-12 Conference (Pac-12), Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC).
Summary
This chapter has established a general understanding of the goals of this research by
explaining the topic of interest, introducing the conceptual framework, and outlining the research
design. The following chapter will provide a review of previous research in order to further
establish how this work will contribute to the literature.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Until the early 1900s, college sport events were run by students. Many times, these
events were organized as social events, similar to recreational and intramural competitions today,
or as activities to protest against curriculum that did not align with students’ aspirations and
goals (Staurowsky et al., 2019). As popularity grew, as well as the potential to generate money
through sport, competition and a culture of winning began to dominate college sport. In one
instance, Harvard attempted to use the athletic talent of a non-student to help them win a rowing
competition over Yale and gain more revenue from spectators, foreshadowing the highly
commercialized and competitive industry that American college sport would evolve into over the
next several decades. Intercollegiate athletic competition was becoming a cultural staple and
students, faculty, and fans wanted college sport to represent the American values of fairness,
integrity, and safety through standardized rules and regulations that promote competitive balance
(Beck & Bosshart, 2003). Oversight began to shift from students to faculty and further from
faculty to conferences in an attempt to increase regulation while university presidents and
administrators remained concerned as the commercialization and competition continued to
escalate. Cheating, injuries, commercialization, and the complex relationship between academics
and intercollegiate athletics prompted a call to further reform college sport and develop a
national entity for governance purposes (Smith, 2000). In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt
held two White House conferences which led to the formation of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) in 1910.
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Historical context of intercollegiate athletics
Intercollegiate athletics continued to rise in popularity with the introduction of football in
1869 and the number of fans attending these events increased dramatically over time. Football
games and rowing competitions in the late 1800s between Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, in
particular, attracted 30,000-40,000 fans, and in 1869, when Harvard visited London to compete
against Oxford in a crew meet, there was an estimated crowd of one million watching along the
Thames River (Smith, 2001). Schools continued to seize opportunities to monetize these events
and by the early 1900s, athletic departments were expanding their football stadiums and charging
fans for tickets to their games became a crucial revenue source for athletic department operations
(Gaul, 2015).
The G.I. Bill
World War II significantly affected college football programs, with 39 percent of thenDivision I-A universities and 82 percent of institutions competing in lower divisions halting their
football programs for at least one year between 1943 and 1946 (Claassen & Boda Jr., 1961). One
of the biggest effects of the war on college football came after it was over with the introduction
of the G.I. Bill. A federal policy providing up to 48 months of college tuition to military
veterans, the G.I. Bill has been compared to free agency in professional sport because military
veterans were able to attend any institution of their choice following their return from the war.
As a result of increased access to air travel, bigger recruiting budgets and bowl payouts, the
influx of talent returning from the war, and the G.I. Bill allowing them free agency, recruiting
was transformed from a regional activity to the hypercompetitive nation-wide effort that is
familiar today (Salaga, 2015). Cohane (1952) stated that “the one mistake the NCAA made after
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the war was to let boys go anywhere to college on the GI Bill, rather than back to where they’d
been. The rich got richer; the poor got poorer” (p. 182).
Broadcasting’s role in the commercialization of college sport
College football was first broadcast on radio in 1921, but it was the sport’s arrival on
television in 1939 that began a significant shift in the landscape of college sport and its ability to
generate revenue and promote universities (Gaul, 2015). The 1951 NCAA Convention focused
on broadcast regulations as the NCAA and member institutions looked to capitalize on
increasing broadcasting rights deals. The convention established the Television Plan which
included regulations that restricted schools’ access to national broadcasts and artificially limited
the supply of football broadcasts in order to gain profit (de Oca, 2008). With the NCAA’s
Television Plan formally introduced in 1952 and limiting broadcasts to one game a week, college
football fans were unable to watch their local teams compete on live television because networks
with exclusive broadcasting rights prioritized games with more national demand (Arico, 1985).
Then, the latest NCAA Television Plan allowed two networks, ABC and CBS, to each broadcast
just 14 total college football games with appearances by individual schools limited and at limited
times of day (Bennett & Fizel, 1995).
Efforts to break away from the NCAA-controlled collective rights deals were thwarted by
the US Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, which exempted the collective sale of college football
broadcast rights on national television from antitrust prosecution, arguing that “collective selling
and distribution of television income … will enhance competitive balance by giving small
market teams equal access to the television market” (Szymanski, 2001, p. 72). Still, schools with
the most competitive and powerful programs grew more and more determined to challenge the
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Television Plan to receive a more representative portion of the revenue they helped generate
through broadcasting rights deals.
The College Football Association (CFA)
College football programs quickly became revenue-generating powerhouses; however,
institutions grew frustrated that the NCAA, rather than individual schools, captured the majority
of revenues from their football broadcasts (Siegfried & Burba, 2004). Created to lobby on behalf
of the interests of the 62 largest football programs, the College Football Association (CFA) was
formed in 1976. In 1981, the CFA was offered a 4-year football broadcasting rights deal with
NBC worth $180 million, evenly divided only among the 62 institutions (Mawson & Bowler,
1989). The NCAA threatened any institution that agreed to NBC’s offer with expulsion, which
would remove any opportunity to participate in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament and any
NCAA-sanctioned post-season bowl games. In the three years that followed, CFA members were
unsuccessful in capturing additional revenue from football television broadcasts due to the
NCAA’s Television Plan.
In I984, the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia, on behalf of all
members of the CFA, went to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the NCAA’s
control over football broadcasts violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Arico, 1985).
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia Athletic
Association, the Court ruled in favor of the CFA, arguing that the NCAA’s Television Plan
hindered competitive balance and granted the CFA the ability to negotiate television contracts on
behalf of its member institutions (Bennett & Fizel, 1995). Following this decision, televised
football games increased significantly, and by 1995, the CFA dismantled, opening the door for
individual conferences and schools to negotiate their own broadcasting rights deals.
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Emerging from the dismantled CFA, today’s Power 5, an informal nickname for the 65
largest college athletic programs, includes institutions from the following five conferences: the
Pacific-12 Conference (PAC-12), the Southeastern Conference (SEC), the Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC), the Big Ten Conference, and the Big 12 Conference. All of these schools
compete within the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), which consists of ten total conferences.
Institutions in the Power 5 hold levels of power, prestige, and athletic and academic brand value
that are unmatched and practically unattainable by schools outside the Power 5 (Lawrence,
2013). The remaining five conferences in Division I FBS are referred to as the Group of Five and
include the American Athletic Conference (AAC), Mountain West, Conference USA, MidAmerican Conference (MAC), and Sun Belt Conference.
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972
The passage of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 fundamentally changed
women’s sport at all levels. Title IX states the following:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. (20
U.S.C. 1681a)
Although the law applies to all educational programs, it is perhaps most famous for its impact on
girls’ and women’s sport programs at all educational levels. Applied to college athletics, Title IX
is a comprehensive piece of federal legislation that requires equal access to opportunity,
athletically related financial aid, practice and competitive facilities, training rooms, food, and
more. Title IX also addresses sexual harassment in the workplace in educational settings, which
has led to broader application in recent years.
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In 1974, the NCAA and the College Football Coaches Association (CFCA) introduced
legislation in an attempt to exclude athletics, specifically revenue-producing sports, from Title
IX (Mak, 2006). The legislation was rejected and instead Congress passed the Javits
Amendment, which specifically included intercollegiate athletics in Title IX and assigned the
U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) as the primary agency for
enforcement (Edwards, 2010). To further promote transparency and Title IX compliance, the
Equity in Disclosure Act (EADA) was passed in 1994 requiring college athletic programs to
report information related to gender equity, including: number of sports offered, participation by
gender, athletic scholarships awarded to males and females, head coaching salaries, overall
expenses, and more (Williams, 1995).
Female student-athletes have undoubtedly benefited tremendously from Title IX over the
last several decades. Between the years 1972 and 2011, the number of girls playing high school
sports increased from 300,000 to over 1.8 million (Wilson, 2012); by 2019, this number
increased to almost 3.5 million (NFHS, 2019), providing a strong and ever-growing pipeline to
collegiate and professional women’s sport. Recent studies, however, show that 90% of
institutions still discriminate against and underfund women in sport (Champion Women, 2021).
Although DI female athletes are over ten percent more likely to graduate than their male
counterparts (NCAA, 2020), a study by Champion Women (2021) analyzing data obtained from
the EADA found that in 2021 women are still offered 63,149 fewer NCAA sport opportunities
than their male counterparts and miss out on over $1 billion in athletic scholarships annually.
This is detrimental to both women and to the educational mission of the university as previous
research has shown that female student-athletes are more likely to identify as a student-athlete
rather than an athlete who is a student (Vogel et al., 2019) and are also more ten percent more
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likely to persist as both a student-athlete (i.e., utilize awarded scholarship without leaving for
professional status) and student (i.e., graduate) (NCAA, 2020; Crom et al., 2009). With men’s
revenue sports producing unprecedented levels of revenue and the public scrutinizing how those
student-athletes are treated and compensated, Title IX will continue to play a crucial role in
ensuring that college sport leaders consider the needs of women and their sport programs
(NCAA External Gender Equity Review, 2021).
Competitive Balance and NCAA Policy
As the levels of commercialization and public interest rose in college athletics in the 20th
century, programs were incentivized to win at all costs, many times through unfair competitive
advantages, prompting a necessary expansion of NCAA rules and regulations (Smith, 2000). The
NCAA justifies its power and regulatory structure as necessary to promote competitive balance
(Eckard, 1998). Three out of the sixteen core principles in the NCAA Division I Manual (2022,
p. 3, emphasis added) directly address the importance of competitive balance:
● 2.10 The Principle of Competitive Equity: The structure and programs of the Association
and the activities of its members shall promote opportunity for equity in competition to
ensure that individual student-athletes and institutions will not be prevented unfairly from
achieving the benefits inherent in participation in intercollegiate athletics.
● 2.11 The Principle Governing Recruiting: The recruiting process involves a balancing of
the interests of prospective student-athletes, their educational institutions and the
Association's member institutions. Recruiting regulations shall be designed to promote
equity among member institutions in their recruiting of prospective student-athletes and
to shield them from undue pressures that may interfere with the scholastic or athletics
interests of the prospective student-athletes or their educational institutions.
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● 2.12 The Principle Governing Eligibility: Eligibility requirements shall be designed to
ensure proper emphasis on educational objectives, to promote competitive equity among
institutions and to prevent exploitation of student-athletes.
Professional sports are similarly governed by leagues that impose specific sets of rules
and regulations designed to manage parity, such as salary caps, luxury taxes, and drafts (Sloane,
1997). In some leagues, income generated from gate receipts, merchandise sales, and media
rights deals are shared and distributed between league members. A league that evenly distributes
broadcasting revenue to all teams provides a small market team the same access to exposure and
income as a large market team (Szymanski, 2001). These types of rules are intended to provide
comparable access to both players and resources to minimize the opportunity for some teams to
have significant advantages over others (Levin & Bailey, 2012).
As nonprofit educational organizations, the NCAA and all its member institutions are
unable to operate with a conventional profit maximization model. In lieu of such structures,
NCAA and university policies promote greater parity as a means of maximizing the value of its
outputs (i.e., games, performance) and inputs (i.e., student-athletes) by standardizing their pay to
the value of a full scholarship and providing them with little to no bargaining power over their
work environment. For instance, the NCAA could decide to add additional postseason
competitions, increasing the marginal revenue product (MRP) and economic rents derived from
each student-athlete while simultaneously decreasing the proportion of the revenue generated by
student-athlete labor that is distributed back to them. Many scholars characterize this as cartel
behavior, where the NCAA pursues other goals at the expense of profit and takes the profits
gleaned from its amateurism model in the forms of prestige, increased exposure, and success in
sport performance (Sutter & Winkler, 2003; Eckard, 1998; DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996).
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Athletic Scholarship Regulation
The first NCAA legislation designed to limit financial compensation to student-athletes
to promote amateurism and competitive balance was established in 1952. Recognizing that
student-athletes were receiving undocumented dollars from boosters and alumni, and in an
attempt to eliminate professionalism or “pay for play,” the 12-Point Code prohibited studentathletes from receiving money from outside entities. It did not, however, regulate how much
money individual institutions could provide student-athletes through financial aid or other forms
of compensation; it simply stated that any dollars student-athletes receive must come from the
institution and must not be tied solely to athletic participation or performance. Without official
upper limits to compensation set and enforced by the NCAA, it is likely that schools provided
inequitable levels of financial benefits to student-athletes (Salaga, 2015). Scholars and
practitioners argue that, through imposing strict limits to direct compensation, the NCAA and
college athletic programs expropriate and share economic rents created by the most talented
student-athletes, preventing them from capturing a fair share of the revenue they generate
(Sanderson & Siegfried, 2015). At the same time, others maintain that NCAA scholarship limits
are essential to maintaining a competitively balanced college athletic landscape by preventing
top programs from “stockpiling players” and distributing revenues more equitably (Sutter &
Winkler, 2003, p. 4).
Establishment of grant-in-aid. At the 1956 NCAA Convention, athletic grant-in-aid
(GIA) was formally adopted as the maximum dollar amount an institution could provide its
student-athletes. GIA ensured that all institutions paid a fairly computed, uniform amount to
student-athletes, calculated by “commonly accepted educational expenses” including: tuition,
fees, room and board, books, and $15 per month for laundry (Salaga, 2015, p. 120). The program

30

notably permitted institutions to provide these dollars based solely on athletic ability and/or
participation without regard to their academic potential or financial need (Klevorn, 2015). GIA
marked the start of standardized student-athlete compensation by the NCAA in an attempt to
promote a more balanced playing and recruiting field. Salaga (2015) studied the impact of GIA
on competitive balance and found that it was not associated with significant, widespread changes
in balance in the most elite and competitive conferences in college football.
Scholarship limits. NCAA policy also limits the number of scholarships each team is
allowed to offer student-athletes. In head count sports, the sports that typically generate the most
revenue (i.e., football, men’s and women’s basketball), all student-athletes who receive athletic
aid receive full GIA scholarships. For instance, the NCAA limited DI FBS football programs to
95 full scholarships in 1977; this limit was lowered to 85 in 1992 (Sutter & Winkler, 2003). In
contrast, in equivalency sports, non-revenue-generating sports such as swimming and rowing,
head coaches receive the value of the allotted number of scholarships in dollars, which they are
able to divide into scholarships of varying amounts among players. For example, women’s
soccer has 14 full scholarships available to distribute. A head coach might distribute 14
scholarships to 14 student-athletes or provide half-scholarships to 28 student-athletes. Of course,
distributions are typically much more complicated than this. Student-athletes receive the
“equivalency” of a full scholarship expressed as a fraction.
Financial aid and Title IX. Title IX requires that financial aid is distributed fairly and
also prohibits athletic programs from financially supporting outside groups that discriminate
based on sex. Dollars spent on men’s and women’s scholarships do not have to be exactly equal;
rather, the “ratio of the total amount expended for the males in the program compared to the
women’s program must be ‘substantially equal’ to the ratio of males to females in the athletics
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program” (Carpenter & Acosta, 2015, p. 69). While this seems like a simple proportionality
calculation, it can get tricky when considering the NCAA limits on scholarships as described
above. When you consider the 85 football scholarships that need to be offset, along with limits to
the number of scholarships in each sport, even if enough women’s teams were added, in most
cases they would still receive less than their proportional share (George, 1999). Title IX does
require that women receive the same opportunity as their male counterparts to earn a degree
through sport. When a non-Power 5 athletic program opts into COA, they also opt into providing
the same opportunity for women’s sports to earn the additional COA stipend as the men. Some
programs only opt in for men’s and women’s basketball, for instance, because of the high
number of football scholarships (85) that would need to be offset for women. Those that choose
to opt-in for football need to offset 85 scholarships by also opting into multiple women’s sports
such as volleyball, soccer, or gymnastics. This same consideration must be made as the NCAA
starts to allow student-athletes to profit off their names, images, and likeness (NIL) in upcoming
years (Dosh, 2021; Buzuvis, 2015).
Inequality in the Division I Football Bowl Subdivision
The Power 5 emerged from programs that capitalized on early and continued success in
college football. These successes established group members as prestigious and elite and
therefore they were able to increase revenues by demanding higher pricing in areas such as
ticketing, broadcasting rights, marketing, and sponsorship deals. Increased revenues allow
athletic programs to invest more in human capital (i.e., student-athletes, coaching,
administration) as well as in facilities, student-athlete well-being, and more, all of which
contribute to long-term resource-based competitive advantages (Smart & Wolfe, 2000; Grant,
1991). The continued success of these advantaged programs leads to a self-reinforcing, positive
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feedback loop (Cheslock & Knight, 2015), resulting in power dynamics that contribute to
sustained financial and competitive inequality across college sport.
Power dynamics in the NCAA
Power is a complex phenomena that is of both sociological and societal interest. The
interesting thing about power is that everyone experiences it, understands it, and knows it
perfectly well until they are asked to define it (Bierstedt, 1950). Bierstedt (1950) states that the
“locus of power is in groups and it expresses itself in inter-group relations; the locus of
dominance is in the individual and it expresses itself in interpersonal relations” (p. 732). In the
economic literature, formal power within organizations is typically defined by positional
authority where those at the top of the hierarchy make the bulk of decisions for others (Li et al.,
2017). Informal power, on the other hand, emerges as organizations or divisions within
organizations experience success, relevance, and notoriety. Once power is gained, those who
hold it are able to influence others and use it for their own advantage.
The cumulative effects of power and influence encourage those who hold it to bias
decisions to work in their favor and ensure they retain the power in the future. Li, Matouschek,
and Powell (2017) state that there are “many examples in which powerful [groups] are able to
hold on to their power, even when the peak of their importance has long passed and even when
they are using it in ways that are clearly self-serving and harmful to the [organization’s] profits”
(p. 217). As college football grew to become the NCAA’s most influential sport, the schools with
the best football teams gained more money, prestige, and power along the way.
Despite regulations allegedly designed to promote balance, in recent years, some still
believe that “parity has left the building … producing a rash of playoff blowouts that have,
frankly, sucked all the drama out of the game’s grandest stage” (Newberry, 2021, para. 10). As it
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seems that policies intended to increase parity have done little to support those outside the Power
5, Sutter and Winkler (2003) question whether key stakeholders truly want competitive balance.
Consistent with a “narrow cartel” (p. 5) view, elite football programs, who hold significant
power across the college sport landscape, may advocate for policy and rules that keep traditional
powers (i.e., Power 5) at the top by raising barriers to entry for weaker teams. The 2015
Autonomy Model particularly provided these schools with formal power to create policy that
affects all Division I schools and allows them to design them with only themselves in mind.
Smith (2000) stated that, “as rules and regulatory systems continue along the road of increased
sophistication, the NCAA will more closely resemble its industry counterparts. It will develop an
enforcement system that is more legalistic in its nature, as regulatory proliferation leads to
increasing demands for fairness” (p. 22).
Power and Title IX. While Title IX was instrumental at increasing girls’ and women’s
participation in sport and integrating women’s sport into the university’s presumably more
legitimate athletic department, it also did so at the expense of female leaders in intercollegiate
sport. The decline and underrepresentation of women coaches and administrators following Title
IX has been well documented (Massengale & Lough, 2010; Whisenant, 2003; Stangl & Kane,
1991). Title IX led to a 185 percent increase in coaching jobs for women’s teams; however, 98
percent of these positions were filled by men (Swaton, 2010). Women athletic directors were
either fired from their positions or demoted to the role of the Senior Woman Administrator
(NWA), a role created after Title IX that brings the most senior level woman into the room
where decisions are made (Rubin & Lough, 2015). Though this gave at least one woman a seat at
the table, so to speak, very rarely did it lead to advancement to administrative roles in college
athletics. Cain (2000) states that this “decline in the number of female collegiate administrators
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in high-level positions in athletic departments … suggests that control over women’s collegiate
athletics is no longer in the hands of women” (p. 350). Within a decade of the founding of the
AIAW and the passage of Title IX, women’s sport programs evolved from informal, volunteer
club sports to NCAA-sanctioned and governed intercollegiate teams as college athletic
administrators moved to reorganize their athletic departments to adopt women’s sport into a
model that was not designed for them. This arguably suppressed women’s voices as leaders in
women’s sport and left them powerless to the predominantly male-led NCAA, whose policy is
typically designed with men’s football and men’s basketball in mind.
Financial inequality in college sport
The financial landscape of the FBS and its member institutions’ athletic programs
remains imbalanced. Even within the most elite and competitive tier of Division I, there is a
considerable wealth gap between athletic programs. In 2018, the median budget for all Division I
FBS programs was $62 million (Knight Commission, 2021). In the same year, the most
profitable athletic program, the University of Texas at Austin, had a budget of $220 million
while the University of Louisiana at Monroe had the lowest budget of any DI FBS school: $15.5
million. Median budgets for Power 5 and Group of Five schools were $96 million and $34.4
million, respectively. This budget discrepancy affects all efforts to remain competitive,
including: recruiting talent (coaches and student-athletes), coaching and administration salaries,
facility development and maintenance, and more.
Competitive Inequality
Competitive imbalance within NCAA conferences represents competitive inequality in
college sport. Built off Rottenberg’s (1956) uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (UOH), the idea
of competitive balance in sport reflects an even distribution of playing talent, resources,
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expenditures, and overall competitive equity as measured by playing strength among teams and
the expectations of fans about the outcomes of sporting events (Vrooman, 2009; Sanderson &
Siegfried, 2003; Szymanski, 2001; Eckard, 1998). In traditional product markets, a monopolistic
share of the market is a desirable position for a firm; in sport, when one team holds the majority
share of the wins within a league, it could hurt the financial well being of the league and all its
players. Predictable leagues and matchups (i.e., consistent blowouts, runaway champions,
dynasties) decrease the perceived value of the product (i.e., the game) because viewers need
some degree of uncertainty as to who will win (Salaga, 2015; Levin & Bailey, 2012; Sutter &
Winkler, 2003). Competitively balanced leagues and matchups, on the other hand, can contribute
to increased demand and fan interest, both of which are crucial to and contribute to increased
ticket sales, media rights deals, university alumni giving, prestige, and more (Salaga & Fort,
2016; Lawrence, 2013; Humphreys, 2002; Vrooman, 1995) in what Neale (1964) describes as
the League Standing Effect. Previous studies found that competitively balanced leagues lead to
increased attendance, revenue, and excitement (Levin & Bailey, 2012; Dobson & Goddard,
2001; Whitney, 1988).
Perline, Noble, and Stoldt (2018) argue that where there is greater revenue potential,
there should be greater competitive balance. This suggests that competitive balance would be the
highest priority in football and men’s basketball. Women’s basketball generates revenue as well;
however, because these revenue levels are typically much lower, competitive balance in
women’s basketball has historically been a lower priority compared to the highest levels of
men’s sports (Perline et al., 2018). Despite this, the 2021 NCAA National Championship Game’s
matchup between Ohio State and Alabama, two Power 5 football programs who hold numerous
national championship titles, ended with Alabama defeating Ohio State 52-24 in “another boring
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blowout in the era of super teams” (Newberry, 2021, para. 2). The game delivered the lowest
television ratings for the college football national championship in almost two decades (Hunte,
2021). On the other hand, the March Madness tournaments stirs up excitement with major
upsets, hopes of “Cinderella story” underdogs defeating typical players (Logan, 2018), and
buzzer beater finishes (Hager, 2012). Even so, ratings for the men’s tournament have declined
while interest in the women’s tournament has risen. The 2021 NCAA women’s basketball
championship, which ended in a 54-53 win by Stanford over Arizona, was the most-watched
women’s sport contest in almost a decade (Young, 2021) and interest in women’s collegiate
sports continues to grow (Brunt, 2021). Increasing interest in women’s sports through more
competitive balance provides an opportunity for key stakeholders (i.e., athletic departments,
sponsors) to build relationships with a highly engaged and growing segment (Kelleher, 2019).
There is also a reciprocal relationship between local market team competitiveness and
overall league competitiveness. The competitiveness of local teams impacts consumer interest in
other league games (Tainsky et al., 2014) and overall league competitiveness impacts demand
for local market games (Knowles et al., 1992; McDonald & Rascher, 2000; Peel & Thomas,
1992; Peel & Thomas, 1996). This suggests that conferences, which can be seen as individual
leagues within the NCAA, should focus on balancing the series of games in a season that lead to
the championship while also considering how each game influences fan interest. A perfectly
balanced individual game begins with a completely uncertain outcome of winning for each
participant and a perfectly balanced league begins each season with each team having an equal
chance of emerging as the champion (Szymanski, 2001).
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Theoretical Frameworks
The Matthew Effect and Cumulative Advantage
Merton’s (1968; 1988) Matthew Effect introduced the idea of cumulative advantage in
science where “certain psychosocial processes affect the allocation of rewards to scientists for
their contributions” (p. 56). Social structures play an important role in science and the
cumulative effects of prestige and notoriety in that “a small fraction of scientists receive more
than their share of research resources, contribute disproportionately to scientific knowledge, and
are accorded the lion’s share of recognition” (Zuckerman, 1998, p. 139). Scholars have applied
the Matthew Effect in empirical studies related to science, business, economics, education, and
more. Studies using the Matthew Effect to understand the stratification of the American
educational system have shown that separating students based on certain characteristics has
cumulative effects on student achievement (Kerckhoff & Glennie, 1999; Oakes et al., 1992;
Dougherty, 1987; Jencks, 1985). Examining how grouping students based on early achievement
levels might affect student outcomes, Kerckhoff & Glennie (1999) found students who were
“tracked” into high, middle, and low achievement groups at early ages tended to remain at
similar levels of achievement throughout their educational careers. In higher education research,
institutional prestige adds another layer of cumulative advantage that allows prestigious
institutions to continuously attract a disproportionately larger share of exceptional graduate
students and researchers who are then able to leverage resources from institutional affiliation to
produce the most exceptional and highly regarded research.
Little research has applied the Matthew Effect specifically to college sport. Research
examining cumulative effects of tangible (i.e., facilities) and intangible resources (i.e., prestige)
in intercollegiate athletics have found that tangible resources contribute to competitive
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advantages in Division I athletics and intangible resources contribute to the continued generation
of tangible resources (Won & Chelladurai, 2016), which then contributes to widening gaps in
wealth and competitiveness. The Matthew Effect posits that inequality is inevitable and
individuals often feel pressured to keep up with or outpace the spending behaviors displayed by
their neighbors (Frank, Levine, and Dijk, 2014). This behavior can be observed as university
leaders continue to allocate substantial resources toward their athletic programs at the expense of
the success of other programs in an attempt to remain competitive and boost the public
perception of their institution in order to attract more overall students, supporters, and donors.
Previous studies have linked spending and winning percentages (Caro & Elder, 2017) and
increased revenues in Power 5 schools have been matched with increased expenditures which
has led to an arms race across all of DI FBS where athletic programs continuously seek to
outspend one another in order to gain a competitive advantage (Gurney et al., 2017; Tsitsos &
Nixon, 2012; Orszag & Orszag, 2005). While these increased expenditures at Power 5
institutions have been met with increased revenues, the same may not be true at Group of Five
institutions, and the cumulative effect of these ever-growing expenditures by more-resourced
programs prompts less-resourced programs to attempt to keep up with them, leading to
cumulative advantage and power.
Scholars argue that competitive balance in college sport becomes a public policy issue
because they are largely publicly funded and numerous campus programs are fighting for their
fair share (Salaga & Fort, 2016). The formal power awarded to the Power 5 through the
autonomy model was largely attributed to the amount of revenue they bring back to the NCAA
and to their individual athletic programs. The Matthew Effect suggests that policies such as COA
only serve to perpetuate the arms race in college athletics by pressuring non-P5 schools to adopt
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higher spending levels even if these monetary investments do little to serve them at any level of
competition. Ultimately, Power 5 conferences will continue to drive spending upward through
autonomous policies, pressuring non-P5 schools to strain their already tight budgets, and the gap
between the haves and have nots in college athletics will continue to widen.
Policy Design Theory
A second theoretical framework that guided this study is policy design theory (PDT).
Schneider and Ingram (1992) state that PDT aims to “explain why some groups are advantaged
more than others independently of traditional notions of political power and how policy designs
can reinforce or alter such advantages” (p. 334). Notably, the theory posits that policy design is a
political and social process, with target populations socially constructed to be viewed as valuable
or invaluable through the use of positive or negative symbols, images, metaphors, and stories
(Gandara, 2018; Schneider & Sidney, 2009; Yanow, 1996). Schneider and Sidney (2009) state
that positively constructed groups “tend to receive beneficial policies with high levels of
discretion, short implementation chains, and strong provisions, in the sense that actual material
benefits are allocated” (p. 107). Schneider and Ingram (1993) describe four types of social
constructions: advantaged (powerful groups with positive images), contenders (powerful groups
with negative images), dependents (powerless groups with positive images), and deviants
(powerless groups with negative images). Power 5 men’s revenue-generating sports, very much a
positively constructed, advantaged group, are viewed as valuable to the organization and to
society because of their storied histories, recognizable brand imagery, and overall prestige
(Lawrence, 2013). Therefore, PDT also helps explain how the autonomy model provides the
positively constructed Power 5 the power to quickly implement policies with men’s sports in
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mind, such as COA, that directly impact how much DI FBS schools need to spend, creating
positive feedback loops that further reinforce inequality.
Women’s sports, as well as non-Power 5 men’s sports, on the other hand, have not been
met with the same levels of prestige and value as their P5 male counterparts. Although all DI
FBS programs are governed by the same policies and regulations, these negatively constructed
groups are at a resource and competitive disadvantage and are largely powerless in the policy
design process. In the case of COA, the policy was designed for and by the Power 5 institutions
because they wanted to further serve their football and men’s basketball programs. Although the
P5 designed COA for this subset of student-athletes, it was implemented within the NCAA
autonomy model, making it applicable to all sports in all DI institutions, as well as Title IX,
requiring athletic programs to implement it in an equitable number of women’s sports; therefore,
it opened the door to a number of potentially unintended consequences of policy implementation
for Group of Five and women’s sports.
An understanding of the effects of policies is an important area of research in higher
education (Krücken, 2014; Beattie et al., 2013; Heise, 2002). Previous research has used PDT to
understand the unintended consequences of policies regarding funding allocations in higher
education (Gandara, 2018). Little to no research has applied PDT to NCAA policies despite the
fact that many policies that affect spending are largely targeted to a small subset of college
athletic programs. Spending, however, has been linked to variability in within-conference
winning percentages (Caro & Elder, 2017). Because COA impacted spending, this study will
examine changes in competitive balance within DI FBS conferences between the years 2008 and
2020 with COA implementation beginning in 2015. During this time frame, overall athletics
spending at DI FBS schools in DI FBS conferences increased from $4.6 billion to $8.9 billion;
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average spending at P5 and G5 schools increased from $62.6 million to $112.5 million and $20.8
million to $50.1 million, respectively (Knight Commission, 2020). As spending levels are vastly
different between the P5 and G5, and the needs of women’s sports are generally not at the
forefront of policy decision-making in the NCAA, PDT would suggest that negatively
constructed groups might experience different changes in balance compared to positively
associated groups following COA implementation.
Research Questions
This study was guided by the following research questions:
1. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with
changes in competitive balance in NCAA Division I FBS conferences?
2. To what extent were changes in competitive balance pre-COA and post-COA
different between the Power 5 and Group of Five?
3. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with
changes in competitive balance in the following NCAA Division I FBS football,
men’s basketball, women’s basketball, women’s volleyball, and women’s soccer?
4. To what extent do changes in competitive balance pre-COA and post-COA differ
within each sport between the Power 5 and Group of Five?
5. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with
differences in competitive balance between men’s and women’s sports, and did
this vary by Power 5 or Group of Five affiliation?
6. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with
differences in competitive balance between men’s and women’s basketball, and
did this vary by Power 5 or Group of Five affiliation?
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Summary
This chapter provided a historical overview of how organizational structure and power
contribute to inequality in the NCAA. The literature suggests that, rather than enact policies to
increase access and level the playing field, those in power design policies to retain power. The
literature also revealed a gap in research on the impact of NCAA policy on competitive balance
in sports other than college football and men’s basketball as well as in conferences outside the
Power 5. Through the frameworks of the Matthew Effect and policy design theory, this study is
intended to build on the literature discussed in this chapter by examining the relationship
between COA, a policy designed for and by the most powerful institutions, and competitive
balance across and within Division I FBS conferences and sports. The next chapter will present
the methods, including the study’s research design, sample, and methodology.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This descriptive quantitative study was designed to understand the relationship between
the COA policy and competitive balance in nine conferences belonging to the Division I Football
Bowl Subdivision. The data span the 2008-2020 intercollegiate athletic seasons for the following
five sports: football, men’s basketball, women’s basketball, soccer, and volleyball. An
interrupted time series (ITS) analysis was used to understand level and trend changes in two
competitive balance measures, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Margin of Victory
Ratio (MVR), before and after COA.
Data Sources
All data in this study were secondary. Data were collected from various publicly
available websites containing performance metrics for the following five sports within Division I
FBS athletic programs: Football, Men’s Basketball, Women’s Basketball, Women’s Volleyball
and Women’s Soccer. These measures were used to calculate conference-level measures of
competitive balance for each sport. The raw data for men’s basketball and football were
collected from www.sports-reference.com. Raw data for women’s basketball, women’s soccer,
and women’s volleyball were collected from https://web1.ncaa.org/stats/StatsSrv/careersearch.
Data from every conference matchup were collected for every sport for each season between the
years 2008 and 2020. This procedure resulted in over 350,000 observations. These raw teamlevel performance data were collected and downloaded as CSV files, coded in Microsoft Excel,
and imported into Stata for statistical analysis (Version 17.0).
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Sample Selection
While COA applied to all 347 member institutions that compete in NCAA’s Division I,
the sample for this study only included schools within conferences that compete in the Football
Bowl Subdivision (FBS). This group of schools competes at the highest level in all sports,
competes regularly against one another, and operates institutionally with similar missions and
values for athletics and academics. Division II, Division III, and non-FBS Division I conferences
were excluded from this analysis. The total number of FBS conferences examined in this study
was nine and the number of institutions belonging to each conference has varied during the time
period of interest in this study.
With respect to athletic scholarships, Title IX requires that athletic departments “provide
reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of each sex in proportion to the number of
students of each sex participating in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics” (34 C.F.R.
1016.37(c). Essentially, if there is an unexplained disparity greater than 1% between athletic
financial assistance awarded to male and female student-athletes, the department would not meet
Title IX’s proportionality requirement. The following five sports were selected for inclusion in
this study because they were the most likely to receive the additional stipend associated with
COA implementation: Football, Men’s Basketball, Women’s Basketball, Women’s Volleyball,
and Women’s Soccer.
Following Eckel’s (1998) study on competitive balance in college football, games played
with opponents from different conferences were excluded from this analysis. Eckel (1998) states
that excluding non-conference opponents strengthens the analysis because “their playing levels
can vary greatly across conference members in a single season, and across seasons for a single
school” (p. 353). Removing these games provides a stronger understanding of how competitive
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balance is affected within conferences across seasons; furthermore, it allows for comparison of
competitive balance between conferences.
Data Collection
Two competitive balance measures, the margin of victory ratio (MVR) and HirschmanHerfindahl Index (HHI), were calculated using raw data on win-loss records, points per game,
and conference champions. These measures will be described in the following sections.
Competitive Balance Metrics
There is no single metric that is agreed upon in the literature as the most appropriate
measure of balance in sport; however, three categories of competitive balance have emerged
from empirical studies: game uncertainty (GU), playoff uncertainty (PU), and consecutiveseason uncertainty (CSU) (Salaga, 2015; Bennett & Fizel, 1995; Cairns, 1987; Sloane, 1976).
Previous research on competitive balance in sport has used a number of measures for
determining parity for each category. PU is more informative and applicable to professional sport
leagues because of the limited number of teams and playoff structure. In college athletics, there
are numerous factors that determine whether a team makes the playoffs, including conference
tie-ins for football bowl games, restructuring, and whether a playoff even exists for a particular
sport; therefore, this study focused on GU by examining how close each game/match was using
the margin of victory ratio (MVR) and CSU by examining within-conference winning
percentages using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
Margin of victory ratio (MVR)
Margin of victory (MV) measures the difference between winning scores and losing
scores in a conference and has been used in previous research to understand individual game
closeness (Sutter & Winkler, 2003). This metric, however, did not account for the changing
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nature of scoring over time and it is therefore difficult to compare balance across seasons by
using the simple average margin of victory. In order to have a metric that is applicable for all
years, Salaga (2015) developed the margin of victory ratio (MVR) which accounts for the total
amount of points scored within a conference and year. This ratio provides additional insight on
game uncertainty and whether a conference or league had evenly matched opponents in any
given year. In order to compare trends in competitive balance across multiple seasons, this study
used the MVR as used in Salaga (2015):

where t is the season, MVg,t is the margin of victory in each conference game g in season t; and
TPg,t is the total points scored in each conference game g in season t. All individual games g
within each season t are then averaged to produce a single value representing competitive
balance related to game uncertainty within any season. The MVR falls between 0 and 1; the
closer the MVR is to zero, the greater game uncertainty and competitive balance is within that
conference.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) comes from the economic literature and is a
commonly accepted measure of market concentration. A high HHI indicates decreased
competition and increased market power. Eckard (1998) first used the HHI to measure
competitive balance in college football by examining the distribution of championships among
teams in each conference. Additional sport economic research has applied the HHI to measure
balance using other performance outcomes including market share of wins (Depken, 1999;
Crooker & Fenn, 2007), winning percentages (Caro & Elder, 2017), poll appearances (Sutter &
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Winkler, 2003), championships (Treber et al., 2013), and recruit destination concentration
(Juravich & Mills, 2017) across seasons in a league or conference across seasons in a conference.
This study builds off previous work by applying the HHI to measure within-conference
competitive balance using winning percentages:

where si is institution i’s winning percentage in sport s in season t and n is the number of
conference members in each season. HHI measures the homogeneity of a population and the
lower the HHI, the more heterogeneous the population becomes; therefore, higher HHI
represents lower within-season competitive balance as measured by distribution of wins among
conference members. The upper and lower bounds of within-season HHI applied to winning
percentages vary with the number of games played each season and the number of members
within each conference (Depken,1999); therefore, analyses in this study will include games and
members as covariates to control for these two measures when comparing HHI values over time.
These covariates will be further described in the following sections.
Interrupted Time Series Analysis
Comparing pre- and post-COA periods with simple t-tests assumes that the difference in
competitive balance is not caused by another underlying trend, autocorrelation, or other
exogenous variable; therefore, the data for this study were analyzed using an interrupted time
series (ITS) design using descriptive statistics. ITS is a commonly used design for evaluating the
effectiveness of interventions with clearly defined pre- and post- intervention periods when a
randomized control trial (RCT) is not possible (Bernal et al., 2017). In a single time series
analysis, a time series of an outcome of interest is used to examine an underlying trend which is
then interrupted by an intervention. The time series is divided into two segments and segmented
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regression is used to statistically measure and compare the level and slope changes in the preand post-intervention periods (Penfold & Zhang, 2013). In addition, the time series allows
researchers to estimate the counterfactual, or the trend, that would have continued in the absence
of the intervention.
Because COA was introduced in all ten conferences at the same time, an ITS design is
appropriate to examine changes, if any, in competitive balance before and after the introduction
of the COA policy in DI FBS in 2015 using COA as the intervention. The initial ITS regression
model for this study was as follows:
CBmetrics,t = !0 + [!1COA + !2(t-t*) + !3(t-t*)COA] + members + [games] + et
or
CBmetrics,t = !0 + !1 * Trendt + !2 * LevelChanget + !3 + TrendChanget + members +
[games] + et
where CBmetricc,t is the measure of competitive balance in each sport s within the FBS during
season t; (t-t*) is a continuous variable that is calculated by subtracting the season of COA
implementation t* from year t; COA is a dichotomous indicator representing pre-COA (0) or
post-COA (1); and [(t-t*)COA] is a continuous variable that equals zero prior to policy
implementation and then counts the number of seasons following COA implementation.
Therefore, !0 is the regression intercept or baseline level coefficient, !1 is the baseline trend in
competitive balance prior to COA in conference c; !2 is the level change coefficient comparing
post-COA to pre-COA; !3 is the trend change following COA; the sum of !1 and !3 is the postpolicy trend slope; members is the number of conference members in year t; games is the number
of conference games played in year t (this variable was only used in the analysis for HHI); and
es,c,t is the error of the model in sport s within conference c during season t.
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To assess whether the relationship of COA with competitive balance was different
between men’s and women’s sports, a dichotomous indicator (MW) was included to indicate
men’s or women’s sport affiliation:
CBmetrics,t = !0 + [!1COA + !2(t-t*) + !3(t-t*)COA] + [!4COA + !5(t-t*) + !6(tt*)COA]*MWs,c,t + members + [games] + et
where MW is a dummy variable equal to 0 for men’s sports and 1 for women’s sports and the
original model is interacted with MW to compare changes in competitive balance before and
after COA between men’s (football, men’s basketball) and women’s (women’s basketball,
soccer, and volleyball) sports.
A similar model was used to compare changes between P5 and G5 conferences:
CBmetrics,t = !0 + [!1COA + !2(t-t*) + !3(t-t*)COA] + [!4COA + !5(t-t*) + !6(tt*)COA]*P5s,c,t + members + [games] + et
where P5 is a dummy variable equal to 0 for Power 5 conferences and 1 for Group of Five
conferences and the original model is interacted with a dichotomous indicator of P5 status to
compare changes in competitive balance before and after COA between P5 and non-P5
conferences.
Furthermore, the following model was used to answer RQ4:
CBmetrics,t = !0 + [!1COA + !2(t-t*) + !3(t-t*)COA] + [!4COA + !5(t-t*) + !6(tt*)COA]*SPORTs,c,t + !7P5
where SPORT is a continuous variable that indicates each sport: football (1), men’s basketball
(2), women’s basketball (3), women’s volleyball (4), and women’s soccer (5).
The following model was used to answer RQ5:
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CBmetrics,t = !0 + [!1COA + !2(t-t*) + !3(t-t*)COA] + [!4COA + !5(t-t*) + !6(tt*)COA]*P5s,c,t + !7MW
And the following model was used to answer RQ5:
CBmetrics,t = !0 + [!1COA + !2(t-t*) + !3(t-t*)COA] + [!4COA + !5(t-t*) + !6(tt*)COA]*BB+ !7P5
where BB is a dummy variable that indicates men’s (0) or women’s (1) basketball.
Covariates
Covariates seek to reduce omitted variable bias and are grounded in theoretical and
empirical research (Stock & Watson, 2007). Covariates were selected because they are not
directly related to the intervention but have the potential to impact the dependent variables.
Covariates were considered significant at the p < 0.05 level, a commonly accepted alpha level in
social science research that guides the decision to fail or reject the null hypothesis based on
“whether or not the test statistic falls into the established critical region” (Franks & Huck, 1986,
p. 245). The covariates selected for this study will be described in the following section.
Number of conference members per season. During the period of interest in this study
(2010-2021), there were multiple instances of conference realignment. Previous research has
shown that conference realignment can influence athletic department finances (Zielen, 2016) and
competitive balance metrics (Quirk, 2004; Owen, 2010). Perline, Stoldt, and Vermillion (2012)
found that conference realignment in Conference USA, a Group of Five conference, between the
years 2000-2010 had a negative effect on overall competitive success in football at the national
level and competitive balance within the conference. Similarly, Noble, Perline, Stoldt, and
Clayton (2016) found that changes in membership in the Big 12, a Power 5 conference, led to
less within-conference balance. In this study, members was a variable indicating the number of
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member institutions in each conference each year and was used in the ITS analyses for both
MVR and HHI.
Number of conference games per season. Season lengths have varied during the period
of interest in this study, and the number of conference games per season may also affect
competitive balance metrics within each conference. Previous research has shown that
competitive balance metrics are sensitive to changes in season length and the number of
conference games played per season within a conference (Owen, 2010; Owen & King, 2015);
therefore, Owen and King (2015) recommend against comparing competitive balance metrics for
leagues or conferences with different numbers of teams or games played. Controlling for the
number of conference games played per season also allows competitive balance metrics to be
compared across seasons and conferences; therefore, in this study, games was the number of
conference games played each season in each sport and was used in the ITS analyses for HHI.
Policy Intervention
The COA policy was introduced and implemented in Division I FBS conferences
beginning the 2015-2016 academic year. Because intercollegiate varsity sports compete during
different seasons throughout the year, the year of COA policy implementation will vary
depending on the sport. For instance, the regular season for college football completes all of its
competitions exclusively in the fall; therefore, changes were observed using 2015 as the first
season of COA implementation. Men’s and women’s basketball, on the other hand, typically
begin competition during the fall with their seasons finishing in the spring. The raw data had
seasons coded with both years (i.e., 2015-16). For the purpose of this study, season year data
were coded as the first year of the academic year in which the season was played. For example,
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in women’s basketball, changes in competitive balance were observed using 2015 as the first
season of COA implementation.
Ethical considerations
This study was exempt from Institutional Review Board (IRB) review because it had
minimal associated risk and does not involve human subjects. All data collected and analyzed for
this study were obtained from publicly available websites. There were no additional ethical
considerations for this study.
Summary
This chapter presented the proposed research design, data collection, and statistical
method to analyze the data as well as explained selected variables and the development of an
interrupted time series regression model. Secondary data were collected from publicly available
websites to calculate two measures of competitive balance. The variables chosen inform the
purpose of the study and help answer the research questions by measuring the relationship
between COA implementation and competitive balance in the Division I Football Subdivision.
The next chapter will report the results of the study.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Overview of Study
The purpose of this study was to understand the relationship between COA and
competitive balance in DI FBS conferences in the following sports: Football, Men’s Basketball,
Women’s Basketball, Women’s Soccer, and Women’s Volleyball. Raw team-level performance
data were collected from various websites using R to scrub HTML coding, downloaded as CSV
files, coded in Microsoft Excel, and imported into Stata for statistical analysis (Version 17.0).
Interrupted time series (ITS) regression analysis was used to determine the relationship between
COA and competitive balance measures in two men’s sports (football, men’s basketball) and
three women’s sports (basketball, volleyball, soccer) in Power 5 and Group of Five athletic
programs. This study was designed to answer the following research questions:
1. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with changes in
competitive balance in NCAA Division I FBS conferences?
2. To what extent were changes in competitive balance pre-COA and post-COA different
between the Power 5 and Group of Five?
3. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with changes in
competitive balance in the following NCAA Division I FBS sports: football, men’s
basketball, women’s basketball, women’s volleyball, and women’s soccer?
4. To what extent do changes in competitive balance pre-COA and post-COA differ within
each sport between the Power 5 and Group of Five?
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5. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with differences in
competitive balance between men’s and women’s sports, and did this vary by Power 5 or
Group of Five affiliation?
6. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with differences in
competitive balance between men’s and women’s basketball, and did this vary by Power
5 or Group of Five affiliation?
Sample
Nine out of the ten NCAA Division I FBS athletic conferences were examined in this
study. Five conferences belonged to the Power 5: Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big 12
Conference, Big 10 Conference, Southeastern Conference (SEC), Pacific-12 Conference (PAC12); and four belonged to the Group of Five: Conference USA (CUSA), Mid-American
Conference (MAC), Mountain West Conference (MWC), and Sun Belt Conference. The
American Athletic Conference (AAC), a Group of Five member, was omitted from the analysis
because the conference was formed in 2013, only two years prior to the introduction of COA.
Schools that moved to the AAC in 2013 were members of other DI FBS conferences (i.e.,
Conference USA) prior to 2013 and conference realignment across multiple DI FBS conferences
happened in this year; therefore, this study controls for the number of members in each
conference.
Interrupted Time Series Results
Forty-five separate interrupted time series regressions were first conducted for each sport
within each conference (i.e., ACC Football, ACC Men’s Basketball). A summary table as well as
the results of each of these analyses can be found in Appendix A. Significant level and trend
changes following COA can be observed within various sports across all nine conferences.
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Conference USA and SEC sports appeared to be the least impacted out of all conferences; the
Mountain West appeared to be the most impacted. The following sections will test whether there
are significant trend and level change differences between various groupings within the Division
I Football Bowl Subdivision.
RQ1: To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with
competitive balance in NCAA Division I FBS conferences?
To answer RQ1, another model tested whether there were changes in overall competitive
balance as measured by MVR and HHI in Division I FBS in all four conferences and all five
sports included in this study following the implementation of COA in 2015. The results of these
ITS regressions can be found in Table 1. The following sections will describe these results in
further detail.

Table 1
All Division I FBS
Division I FBS
MVR

HHI

Baseline Level

0.21154
p = 0.000***

5664.171
p = 0.000***

Pre-COA Trend

-0.00267
p = 0.054

-77.408
p = 0.326

Level Shift

0.0103
p = 0.185

507.95
p = 0.250

Change in Trend

0.00039
p = 0.879
X
0.0014
p = 0.500
-0.00228
p = 0.287

-63.207
p = 0.666
36.143
p = 0.000***
2007.228
p = 0.000***
-140.61
p = 0.257

540

540

(relative to pre-COA)

Games
Members
Post-COA Linear Trend
Observations
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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Figure 1
All DI FBS

Note. This figure shows the results of the segmented regressions in the interrupted time series
models for MVR and HHI. For both variables, a positive slope indicates a trend toward less
competitive balance and a negative slope indicates a trend toward more balance. The level
change variable measures the immediate change observed in the first year of implementation and
the trend change variable compares the post-COA slope to the pre-COA slope to examine if they
were significantly different.
*MVR measures how balanced each individual game was where one represents a perfectly
imbalanced, or blowout game, where the losing team scored zero. An MVR of zero represents a

57

perfectly balanced game where both teams scored the same points. The lower the MVR value is,
the closer the scores were for conference games each season.
*HHI measures the distribution of conference wins each season using winning percentages. A
higher HHI represents less balance in that a smaller number of teams within a conference are
winning a higher share of conference games. A positive slope in HHI indicates that there was a
trend toward more dominance by individual schools each year. An HHI that represents “perfect”
balance, where each team within a conference wins exactly half of their conference games in a
season, varies based on the number of games played and the number of conference members;
therefore, games and members were included as covariates to control for any differences between
conferences and sports.

Margin-of-Victory Ratio (MVR)
There appeared to be no significant changes in MVR following COA implementation
across all sports included in this study (football, men’s basketball, women’s basketball, women’s
volleyball, and women’s soccer). The starting level of MVR for all sports was estimated at an
average of 0.2115 and appeared to decrease every year prior to COA implementation in 2015 by
0.00367 (p=0.054, CI=[-0.005, 0.00005]). In the first year of COA (2015), there appeared to be
an increase of 0.0103 (p=0.185, 95% CI [-0.0049, 0.026]), followed by an increase in the trend
of MVR (relative to the pre-COA trend) of 0.00039 points per year (p=0.879, 95% CI [-0.0046,
0.0053]). We also see that after the introduction of COA, MVR decreased annually at a rate of
0.0023 points (p=0.287, 95% CI [-0.006, 0.002)]. Figure 1 provides a visual display of these
results.
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
There also appeared to be no significant trends in HHI prior to COA and no significant
changes in HHI following COA when looking at all five sports across all nine conferences
included in this study. The average starting level of HHI in NCAA Division I FBS schools across
all included sports was estimated at 5664.171 and HHI appeared to decrease every year prior to
COA by 77.408 points (p = 0.326, 95% CI [231.8, 76.99]). In the first year of COA (2015), there
was an immediate increase of HHI of 507.95 points (p = 0.250, 95% CI [-357.85, 1373.75),
followed by a 1.12% decrease in the annual trend of HHI (relative to the pre-COA trend) of
63.207 points (p = 0.666, 95% CI = [-350.61, 224.2]). After the introduction of COA,
competitive balance increased annually by 2.48 percent as HHI decreased each year by 140.61
points (p = 0.257, CI = [-383.65, 102.42]). Figure 1 provides a visual display of these results.
RQ2: To what extent were changes in competitive balance pre-COA and post-COA
different between the Power 5 and Group of Five?
Schneider and Ingram (1992) state that policy design theory (PDT) attempts to “explain
why some groups are advantaged more than others independently of traditional notions of
political power and how policy designs can reinforce or alter such advantages” (p. 334).
Schneider and Sidney (2009) state that positively constructed groups “tend to receive beneficial
policies with high levels of discretion, short implementation chains, and strong provisions, in the
sense that actual material benefits are allocated” (p. 107), as can be seen with the introduction of
the autonomy model in 2014. Because Power 5 men’s programs are viewed as valuable to the
organization and to society (Lawrence, 2013), P5 institutions’ ability to implement policies
without regard to others and the autonomy model is an example of the power positively
constructed groups have in policy design.
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Table 2
Power 5 and Group of Five
P5 Only
MVR
Baseline Level 0.1938
p = 0.000***

G5 Only

P5 vs G5

HHI
-3239.542
p = 0.099

MVR
0.2293
p = 0.000***

HHI
14228.98
p = 0.000***

MVR
0.2138
p = 0.000***

HHI
5599.524
p = 0.001***

Pre-COA
Trend

-0.0033
p = 0.049**

-102.64
p = 0.273

-0.0021
p = 0.360

-121.31
p = 0.304

-0.0028
p = 0.122

98.362
p = 0.333

Level Shift

0.00744
p=0.417

387.52
p=0.451

.0139
p=0.287

673.612
p=0.320

0.00739
p = 0.475

343.731
p = 0.556

Change in
Trend

0.00436
p=0.151

-112.54
p=0.512

-0.0043
p=0.313

9.926
p=0.964

0.00385
p = 0.254

-216.79
p = 0.259

X

X

X

-0.00621
p = 0.873

719.3322
p = 0.657

X

X

X

0.000268
p = 0.917

-381.46
p = 0.008**

X

X

X

0.0065
p = 0.676

337.81
p = 0.666

X

X

X

-0.00778
p = 0.119

321.23
p = 0.254

-13.719
p = 0.324
3126.62
p = 0.000***
300

X

45.328
p = 0.001***
1208.768
p = 0.000***
240

X

33.99
p = 0.001***
1998.695
p = 0.000***
540

(relative to preCOA)

X
Initial Mean
Level Diff.
Diff. in Mean X
Baseline Slope
X
Level
Treatment
Effect
X
Trend
Treatment
Effect
X
Games
Members

0.00327
p = 0.206
300

Observations
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

-0.0005
p = 0.883
240

0.00146
p = 0.487
540

To answer RQ2, two separate interrupted time series regressions were first used to
examine changes in competitive balance in the Power 5 and Group of Five. The results of these
separate regressions showed that there were no significant changes in MVR or HHI following
COA in both the Power 5 and Group of Five. Because COA was passed through the autonomy
model, which allows the Power 5 to enact policies that favor their needs, another model was
tested to compare differences in competitive balance measures between the Power 5 and Group
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of Five following implementation. To understand the extent to which changes in trends in the
two competitive balance measures following COA differed between the Power 5 and Group of
Five, a binary treatment variable was included to indicate P5 (0) as the control and G5 (1) as the
treated group. The results of this test of policy design theory using ITS regression with treatment
effects can be found in Table 2.

Figure 2
P5 vs G5 Competitive Balance

Overall, these ITS regressions show that competitive balance measures across all sports
were not significantly different between Power 5 and Group of Five programs as measured by
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how close final scores were (MVR). For HHI, there was a significant difference in the mean
baseline slope (p = 0.008); however, there was no significant difference in treatment effect
following COA, suggesting that Power 5 or Group of Five affiliation had little effect on changes
in competitive balance as measured by the distribution of wins within each conference. A
summary of these results can be found in Table 2a. COA was associated with similar changes in
balance in both groups. The following sections will describe the regression results for each
measure of within-season competitive balance.
Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR)
The initial mean level difference in MVR between Power 5 and Group of Five sports (p =
0.873) and the difference in the mean baseline slope were not significant (p = 0.917). In the first
year of COA (2015), there was no statistically significant treatment effect (p = 0.676), and there
was no statistically significant annual decrease in treatment effect (p = 0.119) following COA
implementation. The post-trend output shows that there was no significant change in balance in
Power 5 sport as measured by how close each individual game score was; however, MVR
decreased significantly by 0.0064 in Group of Five sports (p = 0.043**, 95% CI [-0.0127,
0.0002]. The difference between the two was not significant (p = 0.08). Figure 2 provides a
visual display of these results.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
Prior to COA, HHI was trending upward in both the Power 5 (p = 0.273) and Group of
Five (p = 0.304) and after policy implementation, both groups experienced nonsignificant annual
decreases in HHI (p = 0.512; p = 0.964). The initial mean level difference in HHI between Power
5 and Group of Five sports was not significant (p = 0.657); however, there was a significant
difference in the mean baseline slope of -381.46 (p = 0.008, 95% CI [-664.86, -98.05]). These
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findings indicate that both groups started at the same level of parity but trended toward less
balance leading up to COA. In the first year of COA (2015), there was no statistically significant
treatment effect (p = 0.666), and no statistically significant annual increase in treatment effect
following COA implementation (p = 0.254), indicating that any changes in balance following
COA were not significantly different between the Power 5 and Group of Five. In addition, the
post-trend output shows that there were no significant changes in HHI in both the Power 5 (p =
0.465) and the Group of Five (p= 0.327). This change was also not statistically different between
the Power 5 and Group of Five (p = 0.803). Figure 2 provides a visual display of these results.
RQ3: To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with changes in
competitive balance in each of the following NCAA Division I FBS sports: Football, Men’s
Basketball, Women’s Basketball, Women’s Volleyball, Women’s Soccer?
RQ3 explored the changes in competitive balance before and after COA within each DI
FBS sport. Each analysis included both Power 5 and Group of Five conferences. Results provide
suggestive evidence that balance increased in men’s basketball and decreased in women’s
volleyball when looking at how close final scores were for conference games. A summary table
with the results of these regressions can be found in Table 3. The following sections will
describe the results for each of the following sports: football, men’s basketball, women’s
basketball, women’s volleyball, and women’s soccer.
Football
In DI FBS, there were no significant changes observed in MVR or HHI before or after
COA. The following sections will describe the results of each measure of competitive balance in
further detail.
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Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR)
There were no significant changes observed in MVR in DI FBS football before or after
COA implementation. The starting level of MVR for DI FBS Football was estimated at an
average of 0.3409 and appeared to decrease every year prior to COA implementation in 2015 by
0.0036 (p = 0.337, 95% CI [-0.011, 0.004]). In the first year of COA (2015), there was an
increase of 0.0247 (p = 0.268, 95% CI [-0.019, 0.068]), followed by an increase in the trend of
MVR (relative to the pre-COA trend) of 0.00091 points per year (p = 0.900, 95% CI [-0.013,
0.015]). We also see that after the introduction of COA, MVR decreased annually at a rate of
0.00271 points (p = 0.660, 95% CI [-0.015, 0.009)]. Figure 3 provides a visual display of these
results.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
There were no significant changes observed in HHI in DI FBS football before or after
COA implementation. The average starting level of HHI in DI FBS football was estimated at 265.1872 and appeared to decrease slightly every year prior to COA by 5.609 points (p = 0.974).
In the first year of COA (2015), there appeared to be an immediate decrease of HHI of 621.904
points (p = 0.498, 95% CI [-2419.53, 1175.72]), followed by a decrease in the annual trend of
HHI (relative to the pre-COA trend) of 270.76 points (p = 381, 95% CI [-876.78, 335.27]). After
the introduction of COA, HHI decreased annually at a rate of 276.364 points (p = 0.276, CI [774.1, 221.37]). Figure 3 provides a visual display of these results.
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108

108

-270.76
p=0.381
481.695
p=0.000***
1160.732
p=0.000***
-276.364
p=0.276

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

Observations

Members -0.0007
p=0.831
Post-COA -0.00271
Linear Trend p=0.660

Games X

(relative to pre-COA)

Change in Trend 0.00091
p=0.900

-621.904
p=0.498

Level Shift 0.0247
p=0.268

108

-0.0008
p=0.225
0.0008
p=0.311

X

0.00036
p=0.710

108

182.56
p=0.413
87.132
p=0.000***
2113.931
p=0.000***
-110.461
p=0.550

126.178
p=0.850

-5.609
p=0.974

Pre-COA Trend 0.0036
p=0.337
-0.00723
p=0.015*

-293.024
p=0.018**

0.000469
p=0.360

Baseline Level 0.3409
-265.1872
p=0.000*** p=0.933

HHI

M Basketball
HHI
883.2974
p=0.646

Football
MVR
0.0886
p=0.000***

MVR

Division I FBS Sports

Table 3

108

-0.0011
p=0.266
0.0005
p=0.704

X

0.0007
p=0.643

0.0055
p=0.208

-0.002
p=0.792

MVR
0.0679
p=0.000***

108

-134.47
p=0.525
99.6699
p=0.000***
1827.64
p=0.000***
-250.73
p=0.162

1115.07
p=0.085

4916.052
p=0.010**

HHI
4916.052
p=0.010**

W Basketball

108

0.00485
p=0.277
-0.0131
p=0.034*

X

-0.00645
p=0.374

0.0444
p=0.047*

-0.007
p=0.086

MVR
0.30558
p=0.000***

108

694.55
p=0.088
53.763
p=0.001***
1802.293
p=0.000***
185.52
p=0.660

2100.072
p=0.055

-509.034
p=0.007**

HHI
7984.237
p=0.000***

W Volleyball

108

-0.00204
p=0.632
0.0033
p-0.566

X

0.0049
p=0.469

-0.01616
p=0.435

-0.00159
p=0.656

MVR
0.3305
p=0.000***

108

-105.22
p=0.771
73.801
p=0.001***
783.925
p=0.009**
83.462
p=0.785

-346.07
p=0.755

188.68
p=0.335

HHI
7422.437
p=0.010**

W Soccer

Figure 3
DI FBS Football

Men’s Basketball
Margin of Victory Ratio
The starting level of MVR for DI FBS men’s basketball was estimated at an average of
0.0886 and appeared to increase every year prior to COA implementation by 0.000469 (p =
0.360, 95% CI [-0.0005, 0.001]). In the first year of COA (2015), there was a significant
decrease in MVR of 0.00723 (p = 0.015, 95% CI [-0.013, -0.0001), indicating that COA was
associated with more balance in the year COA was introduced as measured by how close each
conference game was. This level change was followed by an increase in the trend of MVR
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(relative to the pre-COA trend) of 0.00036 points per year (p = 0.710, 95% CI [-0.002, 0.002]).
We also see that after the introduction of COA, MVR increased annually at a rate of 0.0008
points (p = 0.311, 95% CI [-0.0008, 0.002)]. Figure 4 provides a visual display of these results.

Figure 4
DI FBS Men’s Basketball

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The average starting level of HHI in DI FBS men’s basketball was estimated at 883.297
and HHI appeared to significantly decrease every year prior to COA by 293.024 points (p =
0.018, 95% CI [139.46, 949.16). This 33.17 percent change in parity suggests that DI FBS men’s
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basketball was trending toward more competitive balance before COA as measured by the
distribution of conference wins. In the first year of COA (2015), there appeared to be an
immediate 14.28 percent decrease in competitive balance as HHI increased by 126.178 points (p
= 0.850). This was followed by an increase in the annual trend of HHI (relative to the pre-COA
trend) of 182.56 points (p = 0.413), representing an annual 20.67 percent decrease in parity.
However, these are not significant. We also see that after the introduction of COA, parity as
measured by share of winning percentages increased as HHI decreased annually at a rate of
110.461 points (p = 0.550). Figure 4 provides a visual display of these results.
Women’s Basketball
No significant trends in women’s basketball for either competitive balance measure prior
to COA. In addition, changes in level and trend coefficients following COA were nonsignificant
for both MVR and HHI, suggesting that overall DI FBS women’s basketball was largely
unaffected by the COA policy. The following sections will discuss the results for each variable in
further detail.
Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR)
There were no significant changes observed in MVR in DI FBS women’s basketball
before or after COA implementation. The starting level of MVR was estimated at an average of
0.0679 and appeared to decrease every year prior to COA implementation by 0.002 (p = 0.792,
95% CI [-0.002, 0.001)). In the first year of COA (2015), there was an increase of 0.0055 (p =
0.208, 95% CI [-0.003, 0.014]), followed by an increase in the trend of MVR (relative to the preCOA trend) of 0.0007 points per year (p = 0.643, 95% CI [-0.002, 0.003]). We also see that after
the introduction of COA, MVR increased annually at a rate of 0.0005 points (p = 0.704, 95% CI
[-0.002, 0.003). Figure 5 provides a visual display of these results.
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Figure 5
DI FBS Women’s Basketball

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The average starting level of HHI in DI FBS women’s basketball was estimated at
4916.052 and appeared to decrease slightly every year prior to COA by 116.26 points (p =
0.308). In the first year of COA (2015), there appeared to be an increase of HHI of 1115.07
points (p = 0.085), representing an immediate 22.68 percent decrease in parity. This was
followed by a decrease in the annual trend of HHI (relative to the pre-COA trend) of 134.47
points (p = 0.525). We also see that after the introduction of COA, HHI decreased annually at a
rate of 250.73 points (p = 0.162). Figure 5 provides a visual display of these results.
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Women’s Volleyball
In DI FBS women’s volleyball, there was a significant level coefficient change in MVR
in the year of COA implementation (p = 0.047), suggesting that matches ended with higher
margins of victory. No other significant changes were observed post-COA relative to pre-COA
in either MVR or HHI; however, the baseline trend in MVR post-COA was significantly
negative (-0.0131; p = 0.034), indicating that conference games are ending with closer scores
each year. These results will be described in further detail in the following sections.

Figure 6
DI FBS Women’s Volleyball
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Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR)
The starting level of MVR was estimated at an average of 0.30559 and appeared to
decrease every year prior to COA implementation by 0.007 (p = 0.086, 95% CI [-0.014, 0.001]).
In the first year of COA (2015), there was a significant increase of 0.0444 (p = 0.047, 95% CI [0.0006, 0.0882]), followed by a decrease in the trend of MVR (relative to the pre-COA trend) of
0.00645 points per year (p = 0.374, 95% CI [-0.021, 0.008]). This indicates that there was a
significant level shift, but the trend before and the trend following COA were not different. We
also see that after the introduction of COA, MVR significantly decreased annually at a rate of
0.0131 points (p = 0.034, 95% CI [-0.025, -0.001). Figure 6 provides a visual display of these
results.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The average starting level of HHI in DI FBS women’s volleyball was estimated at
7984.237 and competitive balance significantly increased every year prior to COA by 6.38
percent (-509.034, p = 0.007, 95% CI [-879.07, -138.99). In the first year of COA (2015), there
was an increase of HHI of 2100.072 points (p = 0.055), representing an immediate 26.3 percent
decrease in competitive balance followed by an increase in the annual trend of HHI (relative to
the pre-COA trend) of 694.55 points (p = 0.088). We also see that after the introduction of COA,
when not compared to the pre-COA trend, HHI decreased annually at a rate of 185.52 points (p
= 0.600). Figure 6 provides a visual display of these results.
Women’s Soccer
In DI FBS women’s soccer, no significant changes were observed before or after COA
implementation in either MVR or HHI. This suggests that overall competitive balance in
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women’s soccer was largely unaffected by the introduction of the COA policy. These results will
be described in further detail in the following sections.

Figure 7
DI FBS Women’s Soccer

Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR)
The starting level of MVR in women’s soccer was estimated at an average of 0.3305 and
appeared to decrease every year prior to COA implementation by 0.00158 (p = 0.656, 95% CI [0.009, 0.0054]). In the first year of COA (2015), there was a decrease of 0.01616 (p = 0.435,
95% CI [-0.0567, 0.02442]), followed by an increase in the trend of MVR (relative to the pre72

COA trend) of 0.0049 points per year (p = 0.469, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.018]). We also see that after
the introduction of COA, MVR increased annually at a rate of 0.0033 points (p = 0.566, 95% CI
[-0.0079, 0.0145). Figure 7 provides a visual display of these results.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The average starting level of HHI in DI FBS women’s soccer was estimated at 7422.437
and appeared to increase slightly every year prior to COA by 188.68 (p = 0.335), representing a
2.54 percent decrease in parity. In the first year of COA (2015), there was an immediate 4.66
percent increase in competitive balance as HHI decreased by 346.07 points (p = 0.755).
Following COA implementation, there was a decrease in the annual trend of HHI (relative to the
pre-COA trend) 105.22 points (p = 0.771). We also see that after the introduction of COA, HHI
increased annually at a rate of 83.461 points (p = 0.785). Figure 7 provides a visual display of
these results.
RQ 4: To what extent do changes in competitive balance pre-COA and post-COA differ
within each sport between the Power 5 and Group of Five?
RQ4 tests policy design theory and is intended to help understand if the Power 5 and
Group of Five experienced different trend changes in competitive balance within each of the five
sports. A binary treatment variable was included using dummy variables to indicate P5 (0) as the
control and G5 (1) as the treated group. The results of this test of policy design theory using ITS
regressions with treatment effects can be found in Table 8. Overall, these ITS regressions show
that changes in competitive balance measures following COA across all sports were not
significantly different between Power 5 and Group of Five programs as measured by how close
final scores were (MVR) or the distribution of winning percentages (HHI). A summary table of
the results of these regressions can be found in Table 4.
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In this table, Pre-COA Trend is the pre-treatment trajectory, Level Change is the change
in level-immediate treatment effect, Trend Change is the change in slope-treatment effect over
time, Initial Mean Level Difference is the difference in baseline level between the two groups,
Difference in Mean Baseline Slope is the difference in pre-treatment trajectory between the two
groups, Level Treatment Effect is the treatment effect of G5 status on the immediate change
observed in the first year of COA (2015), and Trend Treatment Effect is the treatment effect of
G5 status on the observed post-COA trend. The Post-COA Linear Trend shows the slope of the
trajectory following COA independent of the pre-COA trend, and Difference compares this trend
between the two groups.

Figure 8
P5 vs G5 Football
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Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR)
The initial mean level difference in MVR between Power 5 and Group of Five football (p
= 0.606) and the difference in the mean baseline slope were not significant (p = 0.995). In the
first year of COA (2015), there was no statistically significant treatment effect (p = 0.647), and
no statistically significant annual change in treatment effect (p = 0.832) following COA
implementation. The post-trend output shows that there was no significant change in balance in
Power 5 football (p = 0.782) or Group of Five football (p = 0.630) as measured by how close
each individual game score was and the difference between the two was not significant (p =
0.801). Figure 8 provides a visual display of these results.
Men’s Basketball
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The initial mean level difference in HHI of 3033.326 (p = 0.088) and difference in mean
baseline slope of -53.316 (p = 0.860) between Power 5 and Group of Five football were
nonsignificant. In the first year of COA, there was no statistically significant treatment effect
(p = 0.671) and no statistically significant trend change in treatment effect following COA
implementation (p = 0.864). The post-trend output shows that there were no significant trend
changes in HHI for either the Power 5 (p = 0.392) or Group of Five (p = 0.521), indicating that
annual trend changes in balance as measured by the shares of wins within each conference did
not significantly change following COA implementation and changes were not statistically
different between the Power 5 and Group of Five (p = 0.925). Figure 8 provides a visual display
of these results.
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Figure 9
P5 vs G5 Men’s Basketball

Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR)
The initial mean level difference in MVR of 0.0025 between Power 5 and Group of Five
men’s basketball (p = 0.522) and the difference in the mean baseline slope of -0.001 were not
significant (p = 0.170). In the first year of COA (2015), there was no statistically significant
treatment effect (0.0024; p = 0.688), and no statistically significant annual change in treatment
effect (0.00118; p = 0.531) following COA implementation. The post-trend output shows that
there was no significant change in balance in Power 5 (0.0009; p = 0.407) or Group of Five
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men’s basketball (0.00075; p = 0.535) as measured by how close each individual game score was
and the difference between the two was not significant (-0.00015; p = 0.928). Figure 9 provides a
visual display of these results.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The initial mean level difference in HHI of 2110.973 (p = 0.066) and difference in mean
baseline slope of -362.21 (p = 0.084) between Power 5 and Group of Five football were
nonsignificant. In the first year of COA, there was no statistically significant treatment effect
(-1196.09; p = 0.348) and no statistically significant trend change in treatment effect following
COA implementation (543.67; p = 0.180). The post-trend output shows that there were no
significant trend changes in HHI for either Power 5 (-189.07; p = 0.412) or Group of Five
(-7.614; p = 0.976) men’s basketball, indicating that annual trend changes in balance as
measured by the shares of wins within each conference did not significantly change following
COA implementation and that changes were not statistically different between the two groups
(181.46; p = 0.599). Figure 9 provides a visual display of these results.
Women’s Basketball
Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR)
The initial mean level difference in MVR between Power 5 and Group of Five women’s
basketball (-0.00234; p = 0.715) and the difference in the mean baseline slope (0.000054; p =
0.969) were not significant. In the first year of COA (2015), there was no statistically significant
treatment effect (-0.0158; p = 0.080), and no statistically significant annual change in treatment
effect (0.00144; p = 0.596) following COA implementation. The post-trend output shows that
there was no significant change in balance in Power 5 women’s basketball (-0.00021; p = 0.895)
or Group of Five women’s basketball (0.00129; p = 0.458) as measured by how close each
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individual game score was and the difference between the two was not significant (0.0015; p =
0.521). Figure 10 provides a visual display of these results.

Figure 10
P5 vs G5 Women’s Basketball

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The initial mean level difference in HHI of 1034.048 (p = 0.335) was not significant;
however, there was a significant difference in mean baseline slope of 423.297 (p = 0.032, 95%
CI [-810.413, -36.18) between Power 5 and Group of Five women’s basketball. In the first year
of COA, there was a significant increase in HHI of 1649.566 points (p = 0.039, 95% CI [86.91,
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3212.218], representing an immediate 33.79 percent decrease in parity. This difference was not
significantly between Power 5 and Group of Five (-1218.343; p = 0.307), meaning teams in both
divisions experienced a decline in balance. Following COA, there was a decrease in slopetreatment effect (-474.71; p = 0.066) and both the Power 5 and Group of Five experienced a
similar trend (748.75; p = 0.052). The post-trend output shows that there were no significant
trend changes in HHI for either Power 5 (p = 0.074) or Group of Five (p = 0.788) women’s
basketball, indicating that annual trend changes in balance as measured by the shares of wins
within each conference were not significant following COA implementation and that these
changes were not statistically different between the Power 5 and Group of Five (p = 0.323).
Figure 10 provides a visual display of these results.
Women’s Volleyball
Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR)
The initial mean level difference in MVR between Power 5 and Group of Five women’s
volleyball (-0.00481; p= 0 .334) and the difference in the mean baseline slope (-0.0034; p =
0.640) were not significant. In the first year of COA (2015), there was no statistically significant
treatment effect (0.0489; p = 0.184), and no statistically significant annual change in treatment
effect (-0.0178; p = 0.211) following COA implementation. The post-trend output shows that
there was no significant change in MVR in Power 5 women’s basketball (-0.00361; p = 0.658);
however, MVR following COA was significant in Group of Five women’s volleyball (-0.0249; p
= 0.006). The difference between the two, however, was not statistically significant (-0.0213; p =
0.082). Figure 11 provides a visual display of these results.
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Figure 11
P5 vs G5 Women’s Volleyball

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The initial mean level difference in HHI between Power 5 and Group of Five women’s
volleyball (1792.763; p = 0.253) was not significant; however, there was a significant difference
in the mean baseline slope (-708.1696; p = 0.037; 95% CI [-1372.503, -43.835]). This indicates
that Power 5 and Group of Five women’s volleyball had significantly different trends in parity
prior to COA, with G5 women’s volleyball trending toward more balance and P5 women’s
volleyball trending toward less balance. In the first year of COA (2015), there was no
statistically significant level change in MVR (1996.559; p = 0.147) and there was not a
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significant difference between the P5 and G5 (375.7538; p = 0.855). The change in slopetreatment effect (334.66; p = 0.480) and treatment effect (629.3327; p = 0.344) following COA
were not significant. This suggests that, while P5 and G5 women’s volleyball were trending in
opposite directions prior to COA, they both experienced similar level and trend changes
following COA implementation. This shift is clearly depicted in Figure 1.
Women’s Soccer
Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR)
The initial mean level difference in MVR between Power 5 and Group of Five women’s
soccer (0.0045; p = 0.869) and the difference in the mean baseline slope (0.00561; p = 0.400)
were not significant. In the first year of COA (2015), there was no statistically significant
treatment effect (-0.03429; p = 0.397), and no statistically significant annual change in treatment
effect (-0.01972; p = 0.129) following COA implementation. The post-trend output shows that
there was no significant change in balance in Power 5 (0.00954; p = 0.199) or Group of Five
women’s soccer (-0.00456; p = 0.583) as measured by how close each individual game score was
and the difference between the two was not significant (-0.01411; p = 0.206). Figure 12 provides
a visual display of these results.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The initial mean level difference in HHI of -126.5533 (p = 0.937) and the difference in
mean baseline slope (-89.195; p = 0.805) was not significant. In the first year of COA, there was
no significant treatment effect (3633.134; p = 0.098) and no significant treatment in the years
following COA implementation (-771.84; p = 0.274). The post-trend output shows that there
were no significant trend changes in HHI for either Power 5 (468.326; p = 0.074) or Group of
Five (-392.7128; p = 0.384) women’s soccer, indicating that annual trend changes in balance as
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measured by the shares of wins within each conference were not significant following COA
implementation. These changes were also not statistically different between the Power 5 and
Group of Five (-861.039; p = 0.155). Figure 12 provides a visual display of these results.

Figure 12
P5 vs G5 Women’s Soccer

RQ5: To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with differences
in competitive balance between men’s and women’s sports, and did this vary by Power 5 or
Group of Five affiliation?
Because COA was designed with Power 5 men’s sports in mind, RQ5 again tests policy
design theory to see if women’s sports experienced any unintended consequences to COA
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implementation. Changes in MVR and HHI are first compared between all men’s sports vs all
women’s sports with dummy variables included to indicate men’s (0) and women’s (1) sports.
Two additional analyses were then conducted to see if changes between men’s and women’s
sports were different within Power 5 and Group of Five conferences. A summary of these results
can be found in Table 5. The same binary variables were included to compare Power 5 men’s (0)
vs Power 5 women’s (1) sports as well as Group of Five men’s (0) vs Group of Five women’s (1)
sports.
All Men’s Sports vs All Women’s Sports
Margin of Victory Ratio
Prior to COA, MVR was trending upward in both the men’s (p = 0.437) and women’s (p
= 0.073) sports and after policy implementation, both groups experienced nonsignificant annual
decreases in HHI (p = 0.758; p = 0.973). The initial mean level difference in MVR (p = 0.383)
between men’s and women’s sports and the difference in mean baseline slope (p = 0.727) were
not significant, suggesting that both groups had similar starting levels and trends in MVR leading
up to COA. Both groups also experienced nonsignificant level (p = 0.437; p= 0.282) and trend
(p = 0.758; p = 0.9873) changes following COA, relative to pre-COA. When comparing whether
these changes differed between the two groups, there was no statistically significant treatment
effect (p = 0.874), and no statistically significant annual increase in treatment effect following
COA implementation (p = 0.807), indicating that, when looking at all of DI FBS, the men’s and
women’s sports did not experience significantly different changes following COA. In addition,
the post-trend output shows that there were no significant changes in MVR in both the men’s (p
= 0.157) and women’s (p = 0.704). This change was also not statistically different between the
two (p = 0.399). Figure 13 provides a visual display of these results.
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Figure 13
All Men’s vs All Women’s Sports

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
For HHI, no significant level or trend changes following COA were observed in overall
men’s sports. Although there was a small immediate increase in HHI for women’s sports,
indicating that games ended with higher margins of victory, results showed that this change was
nonsignificant (995.828; p = 0.084) in the first year of COA implementation. When comparing
the two, there was a significant initial mean level difference (p = 0.000) and a significant
difference in mean baseline slope (p = 0.013). This indicates that women’s sports started at a
significantly higher level of parity compared to men’s sports and, while both groups trended
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toward more imbalance leading up to COA, men’s sports did so at a significantly higher rate.
Following COA implementation, there was not a significant difference in the level change of
HHI (p = 0.180) between both groups; however, there was a significant difference in the level
treatment effect (p = 0.046), showing that the two groups trended toward more balance at
significantly different rates. The post-trend output shows that there were no significant trend
changes in HHI for either men’s (-270.658; p = 0.157) or women’s (-60.813; p = 0.704) sports
and there was no significant difference between the two (209.85; p = 0.399). Figure 13 provides
a visual display of these results.
Power 5 Men’s vs Power 5 Women’s Sports
Margin of Victory Ratio
The results show that there were no significant trends in MVR prior to COA and no
significant changes in MVR following COA between Power 5 men’s and women’s sports. The
initial mean level difference of 0.03467 in MVR between men’s and women’s sports (p = 0.512)
and the difference in the mean baseline slope were not significant (-0.0015; p = 0.622),
indicating that Power 5 men’s and women’s sports had similar starting levels of MVR. In the
first year of COA (2015), there was no statistically significant treatment effect (0.00612; p =
0.743), and no statistically significant annual change in treatment effect (0.00364; p = 0.544)
following COA implementation. The post-trend output shows that there was no significant
change in balance in P5 men’s sports (-0.00021; p = 0.957) or women’s sports (0.0019; p =
0.558) as measured by how close each individual game score was and the difference between the
two was not significant (0.002123; p = 0.680). Figure 14 provides a visual display of these
results.
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Figure 14
Power 5 Men’s vs P5 Women’s

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The results show that Power 5 men’s and women’s sports had significantly different
initial mean levels of HHI (-4852.11; p = 0.009; 95% CI [-8488.09, -1216.132]) and HHI was
trending slightly toward more balance (-487.88; p = 0.062) prior to COA. The difference in mean
baseline slope was significant (-360.237; p = 0.036; 95% CI [-696.47, -24.007]). This indicates
that Power 5 men’s sports began at a level of parity that was significantly lower than P5
women’s sports and, while they both trended toward more balance in the years leading up to
COA, women’s sports trended toward more balance at a significantly higher rate than men’s
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sports. In the first year of COA, there was no significant difference between the level changes
experienced by both groups (770.08; p = 0.459). There was also no significant trend change
following COA implementation (-487.88; p = 0.062) and P5 men’s or women’s affiliation had no
treatment effect (619.29; p = 0.064). The post-trend output shows that there were no significant
trend changes in HHI for either Power 5 men’s (-371.84; p = 0.094) or women’s (-112.78; p =
0.814) sports, indicating that annual trend changes in balance as measured by the shares of wins
within each conference did not change following COA implementation and that changes were
not statistically different between the men’s and women’s sports (259.057; p = 0.369). Figure 14
provides a visual display of these results.
Group of Five Men’s vs Group of Five Women’s Sports
Margin of Victory Ratio
The results show that there were no significant trends in MVR prior to COA and no
significant changes in MVR following COA between Group of Five men’s and women’s sports.
The initial mean level difference in MVR between men’s and women’s sports (0.0332, p =
0.565) and the difference in the mean baseline slope were not significant (-0.00015, p = 0.973),
indicating that Group of Five men’s and women’s sports had similar starting levels of parity as
measured by how close individual games were. In the first year of COA (2015), there was no
statistically significant treatment effect (p = 0.939), and no statistically significant annual change
in treatment effect (p = 0.387) following COA implementation. The post-trend output shows that
there was no significant change in balance in Group of Five men’s sports (p = 0.742); however,
there was a significant post-intervention linear trend for Group of Five women’s sports (-0.0093,
p = 0.043). The difference between the two was not significant (p = 0.304). Figure 15 provides a
visual display of these results.
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Figure 15
Group of Five Men’s vs Group of Five Women’s

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The results show that Group of Five men’s and women’s sports had significantly
different initial mean levels of HHI (-4964.516, p = 0.011; 95% CI [-8789.097, -1139.936]) and
HHI was trending toward less balance (130.693; p = 0.465) prior to COA for both groups. The
mean baseline slope was not significantly different (-419.336; p = 0.063) between the two
groups, indicating that both started at similar levels of parity. In the first year of COA, there was
no statistically significant treatment effect (2000.082; p = 0.143) and no statistically significant
treatment effect following COA implementation (447.952; p = 0.311). The post-trend output
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shows that there were no significant trend changes in HHI for either Group of Five men’s
(-133.8124; p = 0.647) or women’s (-105.196; p = 0.669) sports, indicating that annual trend
changes in balance as measured by the shares of wins within each conference did not change
following COA implementation and that changes were not statistically different between G5
men’s and women’s sports (28.62; p = 0.940). Figure 15 provides a visual display of these
results.
RQ6: To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with differences
in competitive balance between men’s and women’s basketball, and did this vary by Power
5 or Group of Five affiliation?
Because football is allocated 85 full scholarships, athletic programs are able to offer COA
stipends to 85 men’s football players each year. To remain in compliance with Title IX,
programs must offset this number on the women’s side; this is typically achieved through
women’s sports such as volleyball and soccer. Men’s basketball similarly is allocated 13 full
scholarships. This must also be offset on the women’s side; however, because it has a related
women’s sport counterpart, this is more easily achieved by offering the same number of
scholarships and COA stipends to women’s basketball. Men’s and women’s basketball seasons
are also most readily comparable because point structures, number of games, and time of year
are similar.
To further understand how women’s sports may have experienced unintended
consequences related to COA implementation, RQ6 explored changes in balance between men’s
and women’s basketball. Changes in MVR and HHI were first compared between DI FBS
basketball with dummy variables included to indicate men’s (0) and women’s (1) basketball.
Two additional analyses were then conducted to determine whether changes between men’s and

91

women’s sports were different within Power 5 and Group of Five conferences. The same binary
variables were included to compare Power 5 men’s (0) vs Power 5 women’s (1) basketball as
well as Group of Five men’s (0) vs Group of Five women’s (1) basketball.
Division I FBS Men’s vs Women’s Basketball
Margin of Victory Ratio
Men’s and women’s basketball started at significantly different levels of parity as
indicated by a significant initial mean level difference in MVR (-0.0249, p < 0.001), with men’s
basketball games ending with margins of victory that were 27.7 percent greater than women’s
basketball games. The pre-treatment trajectory (0.0005, p = 0.431) and the difference in the mean
baseline slope were not significant (-0.00077, p = 0.377). In the first year of COA (2015), there
was a statistically significant treatment effect (0.01273, p = 0.016), indicating that men’s and
women’s basketball experienced different immediate changes the year COA was introduced,
with closer scoring in men’s basketball and larger margins of victory in women’s basketball. The
treatment effect following COA was not significant (0.000388, p = 0.819), indicating that both
groups experienced a similar post-COA trend change in parity as measured by MVR. The posttrend output shows that there was no significant change in balance in men’s (0.00083; p = 0.419)
or women’s (0.00045; p = 0.661) basketball as measured by how close each individual game
score was and the difference between the two was not significant (-0.00038; p = 0.794). Figure
16 provides a visual display of these results.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
There was a significant downward trend in HHI (-281.77 p = 0.014) in men’s and
women’s basketball prior to COA, suggesting a trend toward more parity. The initial mean level
difference (1889.347, p = 0.067) and difference in mean baseline slope (139.7955, p = 0.368)
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Figure 16
DI FBS Men’s Basketball vs Women’s Basketball

between men’s and women’s basketball were not significant. This indicates that men’s and
women’s basketball began at similar levels of parity as measured by HHI and both trended
downward prior to COA implementation at similar rates. In the first year of COA, there was no
statistically significant treatment effect (980.362; p = 0.292) and no statistically significant
treatment effect following COA implementation (-282.28; p = 0.350). This indicates that men’s
and women’s basketball experienced similar level and trend changes following COA. The posttrend output shows that there were no significant trend changes in HHI for either men’s (-106.46;
p = 0.557) or women’s (-248.945; p = 0.171) basketball, indicating that annual trend changes in
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balance as measured by the shares of wins within each conference did not change following
COA implementation and that changes were not statistically different between the two groups (142.48; p = 0.580). Figure 16 provides a visual display of these results.
Power 5 Men’s Basketball vs Power 5 Women’s Basketball

Figure 17
Power 5 Men’s vs Women’s Basketball

Margin of Victory Ratio
There was a significant initial mean level difference between Power 5 men’s and
women’s basketball (-0.02277, p < 0.001, 95% CI [-0.033, -0.012]), indicating that the starting

95

level of margin of victory in P5 women’s basketball was 26.2 percent closer than P5 men’s
basketball. The difference in mean baseline slope was not significant (-0.0014, p = 0.192). There
was a significant treatment effect (0.0205, p = 0.001) showing that Power 5 women’s basketball
experienced a significantly different immediate change in game closeness compared to P5 men’s
basketball in the first year of COA implementation with P5 WBB experiencing less balanced
games and P5 MBB games ending with closer scores. Following COA, there was no significant
treatment effect (0.00029, p = 0.888), indicating that both groups experienced similar post-policy
trend changes (relative to pre-COA trend) in MVR. The post-trend output shows that there was
no significant change in MVR in Power 5 men’s (0.000896; p = 0.478) and women’s (-0.00021;
p = 0.871) basketball as measured by how close each individual game score was and the
difference between the two was not significant (-0.0011; p = 0.537). Figure 17 provides a visual
display of these results.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The initial mean level difference (-1294.035, p = 0.401) and difference in mean baseline
slope (2.309, p = 0.989) for HHI were not significant. This indicates that Power 5 men’s and
women’s basketball began at similar levels of parity as measured by HHI and both trended
downward prior to COA implementation at similar rates. There was no significant treatment
effect (1042.7; p = 0.313), indicating that both P5 MBB and P5 WBB did not experience an
immediate change in game closeness in the first year of COA. In the years following COA, there
was no significant trend change (relative to pre-COA trend) (-161.62; p = 0.505) and P5 men’s or
women’s basketball affiliation did not have a significant effect on this change (-124.67; p =
0.711). The post-trend output shows that there were no significant trend changes in HHI for
either Power 5 men’s (-232.014; p = 0.251) or women’s (-354.373; p = 0.079) basketball,
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indicating that annual trend changes in balance as measured by the shares of wins within each
conference did not change following COA implementation and that changes were not statistically
different between the two groups (-122.359; p = 0.669). Figure 17 provides a visual display of
these results.
Group of Five Men’s Basketball vs. Women’s Basketball
Margin of Victory Ratio
There was a significant initial mean level difference between Group of Five men’s and
women’s basketball (-0.02759, p < 0.001, 95% CI [-0.037, -0.012]). The difference in mean
baseline slope was not significant (-0.00001, p = 0.993). In the first year of COA, there was no
significant treatment effect (0.0032, p = 0.697) and no significant treatment effect following
COA (0.00051, p = 0.847). This indicates that in 2008, Group of Five women’s basketball ended
with closer scores that were 27.18 percent closer than G5 men’s basketball and both G5 MBB
and G5 WBB trended toward more balance and closer games leading up to COA. Following
COA, both groups experienced similar nonsignificant changes to the level and trend of MVR.
The post-trend output shows that there was no significant change in MVR in G5 men’s (0.00079;
p = 0.620) or women’s (0.00132; p = 0.412) basketball as measured by how close each
individual game score was and the difference between the two was not significant (0.000521; p
=0.818). Figure 18 provides a visual display of these results.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
The average starting level of HHI in G5 men’s and women’s basketball was estimated at
5286.652 (p = 0.006; 95% CI [1502.761, 9070.544]) and HHI appeared to decrease significantly
every year prior to COA by 471.35 points (p = 0.001, 95% CI [-755.83, -187.08]). The initial
mean level difference (3201.48; p = 0.021; 95% CI [486.57, 5916.385]) was significant and the
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Figure 18
Group of Five Men’s vs Women’s Basketball

difference in mean baseline slope was not significant (194.29; p = 0.329). This indicates that G5
men’s and women’s basketball began at significantly different levels of parity and both
experienced a similar trend toward more balance before COA was introduced. In the year of
COA implementation, there was a negative level change in HHI (-827.83; p = 0.330) and P5
men’s or women’s basketball affiliation had no significant treatment effect (1265.251; p =
0.290). Following COA, there was a 472.38 increase in HHI (p = 0.083) and the treatment effect
of P5 men’s/women’s basketball was nonsignificant (-399.47; p = 0.381). This suggests that both
groups experienced a similar nonsignificant immediate change in parity the year COA was
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introduced and also experienced similar s nonsignificant trend changes (relative to pre-COA
trend) in the years following. The post-trend output shows that there were not significant postpolicy trend changes in HHI for either Group of Five men’s (1.025; p = 0.996) or women’s (144.15; p = 0.540) basketball, and the changes were not statistically different between the two (145.18; p = 0.660). Figure 18 provides a visual display of these results.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to present the results of the study. The chapter began by
outlining the study sample, including conferences and sports included in the analyses. The
second section described the variables used to measure within-season competitive balance,
including the Margin of Victory Ratio (MVR) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Each
subsequent section described each interrupted time series regression model designed for each
research question and presented the results. Results revealed that changes in both MVR and HHI
were different among groupings of sports and conferences. Key findings will be discussed in
Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
This study examined changes in competitive balance before and after the 2015 Cost of
Attendance (COA) policy was passed in NCAA Division I (DI) Football Bowl Subdivision
(FBS) programs. This final chapter provides an overview of the study and discussion of the
results that were presented in Chapter 4. Finally, this chapter details study implications for
practice along with limitations and recommendations for future research.
Overview of the Study
This study explored changes in competitive balance in Division I FBS conferences
surrounding a policy change using two frameworks with little previous application in this space:
the Matthew Effect and policy design theory (PDT). Previous works have examined inequality in
the NCAA using program budgets (Ngo et al., 2022; Jewell, 2020; Cheslock & Knight, 2015),
television revenues (Mawson, 1989), recruiting rankings (Dronyk-Trosper & Stitzel, 2017; Caro,
2012; Langelett, 2003), and facilities (Huml et al., 2019). This study used winning percentages
and game closeness to investigate how COA may have influenced competitive balance within
Division I FBS conferences. Designed for and by the most elite male college athletic programs,
the 2015 Cost of Attendance (COA) policy increased the upper limit of direct payments that
student-athletes were able to receive from their athletic programs for the first time in decades.
The associated cost with COA implementation at DI FBS schools was upwards of over $1
million dollars per year per school, which altered the distribution of revenue within athletic
departments (Ngo, et al., 2022). The optional nature of the policy provided Group of Five
conferences and their member institutions with an opportunity to avoid increased spending;
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however, they all chose to opt in, increasing spending in all Division I Football Subdivision
conferences, and potentially altering the balance of overall and within-conference competition.
Competitive balance remains a concern in college sport because predictable leagues and
matchups (i.e., consistent blowouts, runaway champions, dynasties) decrease the perceived value
of the product (i.e., the game) as viewers need some degree of uncertainty as to who will win
(Salaga, 2015; Levin & Bailey, 2012; Sutter & Winkler, 2003). Previous studies specifically
examining how implementation of the COA policy influenced competitive balance found that
COA was associated with changes in recruiting rankings (Bradburry & Pitts, 2018) and revenue
distributions (Ngo et al., 2022). Previous studies investigating the relationship between NCAA
policy, structural changes, and competitive balance metrics have focused almost exclusively on
Power 5 football or men’s basketball (Salaga & Fort, 2017; Salaga, 2015; Depken & Wilson,
2006; Quirk, 2004; Sutter & Winkler, 2003; Bennett & Fizel, 1995). Limited research has
examined changes in parity within individual conferences outside the Power 5 or within
women’s sports. This study adds to the literature by including less-investigated sports and
conferences, focusing on changes in within-conference competitive balance following COA
implementation compared to existing trends observed prior to policy implementation, and
building off previous studies on power and balance (Cheslock & Knight, 2015; Eckard, 1998).
Previous literature has measured competitive balance in many different ways, including:
game uncertainty (GU), playoff uncertainty (PU), and consecutive-season uncertainty (CSU).
This study focuses on GU by looking at how close each individual conference matchup was
using the margin of victory ratio (MVR) and CSU by understanding how conference leaders
change each year using the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI), which measures how the shares
of conference wins were distributed each season among conference members. The purpose of
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this descriptive study was to examine the relationship between the COA policy and competitive
balance in DI FBS conferences in the following sports: Football, Men’s Basketball, Women’s
Basketball, Women’s Soccer, and Women’s Volleyball. The following research questions guided
the analysis:
1. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with changes in
competitive balance in NCAA Division I FBS conferences?
2. To what extent were changes in competitive balance pre-COA and post-COA different
between the Power 5 and Group of Five?
3. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with changes in
competitive balance in the following NCAA Division I FBS sports: football, men’s
basketball, women’s basketball, women’s volleyball, and women’s soccer?
4. To what extent do changes in competitive balance pre-COA and post-COA differ within
each sport between the Power 5 and Group of Five?
5. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with differences in
competitive balance between men’s and women’s sports, and did this vary by Power 5 or
Group of Five affiliation?
6. To what extent was the implementation of the COA policy associated with differences in
competitive balance between men’s and women’s basketball, and did this vary by Power
5 or Group of Five affiliation?
Interrupted time series (ITS) regression models were used to analyze raw secondary data
that were collected from various publicly available websites containing performance metrics for
each sport. ITS is appropriate when examining pre- and post-policy level and trend changes
when all groups experienced the policy change at the same time (i.e., COA implementation in
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2015). The sample included nine out of the ten DI FBS conferences belonging to the Power 5
(ACC, Big 12, Big 10, SEC, PAC12) and Group of Five (CUSA, MAC, MWC, Sun Belt). The
American Athletic Conference (AAC) was omitted from the analysis because it was formed in
2014 and there was not enough long-term data to analyze. The results of this study were
analyzed through the theoretical frameworks of the Matthew Effect and policy design theory
(PDT). Little to no research has applied the Matthew Effect or PDT to NCAA policies despite
the fact that many policies that affect spending are largely targeted to a small subset of college
athletic programs, contributing to unintended consequences in non-targeted groups and widening
gaps in wealth and competitiveness. Through these frameworks, the expectation at the beginning
of this study was that autonomous policies such as COA may serve to perpetuate the arms race in
college athletics by pressuring non-autonomous schools to adopt higher spending levels with an
intent to remain competitive with P5 schools. Furthermore, because spending levels are
significantly different between positively (P5 football and men’s basketball) and negatively
(women’s sports and non-P5 sports) constructed groups in the NCAA (Knight Commission,
2020), it was expected that negatively constructed groups might experience different changes in
balance compared to positively associated groups following COA implementation. Because
scoring and winning are influenced by a myriad of factors that were outside the scope of this
study, the design of the study does not warrant causal inference; however, the results provide a
picture of how balance has evolved over the years and how COA, an autonomous policy, may be
associated with changes in balance within and between varying groups. The following sections
will describe and interpret the results of the study.
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Discussion of the Results
This section will discuss these findings through the conceptual frameworks of the
Matthew Effect and policy design theory (PDT). The cost of attendance policy, designed by the
Power 5 through the autonomy model, allowed Division I institutions to provide additional living
stipends in order to better financially support their student-athletes. In doing so, the policy raised
spending levels across DI FBS schools and potentially further strained the already tight budgets
of Group of Five schools. The results from this analysis suggest that the Power 5, through the
COA policy, placed pressure on the Group of Five to spend money they did not have and did
little to improve within-conference measures of competitive balance. These behaviors contribute
to the college athletics arms race, where athletic programs continuously seek to outspend one
another to gain competitive advantages (Gurney et al., 2017; Orszag & Orszag, 2005), leading to
cumulative advantage as described by the Matthew Effect.
Policy design theory states that advantaged groups design policies that reinforce their
advantages (Schneider & Ingram, 1992) and helps understand the broader consequences of COA
on competitive balance. Understanding how affiliation with positively or negatively constructed
groups affected COA’s influence on parity and overall inequality was a central component of this
study because the design of the policy lends itself to reinforce or alter advantages already
experienced by positively constructed groups (Schneider & Ingram, 1992). Power 5 men’s sports
are viewed as a positively constructed and advantaged group because of their storied histories,
recognizable brand imagery, and overall prestige (Lawrence, 2013) and they have been afforded
structures such as the autonomy model that ensure their best interests are met. All other DI FBS
sport programs are viewed as negatively constructed because decisions are typically not made
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with their needs in mind. The following sections will discuss how changes in competitive
balance following COA were different between positively and negatively constructed groups.
Power 5 vs Group of Five
In the initial analyses of the 45 individual conference sports, only one conference had no
significant post-policy changes in any sport: the Southeastern Conference (SEC). Since the SEC
has the highest budgets and recruiting classes of all NCAA conferences (Knight Commission,
2020), this was not surprising. With the exception of closer games in G5 women’s basketball
compared to P5 women’s basketball, G5 sports did not experience changes following COA that
were significantly different than their P5 counterparts. In other words, COA appeared to have the
same effects on balance in both G5 and P5.
Although both groups experienced similar changes in balance following COA, the
financial implications of COA were different for the P5 and G5. Ngo, Coyner, and Lough (2022)
found that COA was associated with increased marketing and sponsorship revenues in Power 5
schools; in Group of Five schools, the only revenue increases were in institutional and
government support. When college athletic programs are publicly funded, many argue that
competitive balance is a public policy issue because numerous campus programs are fighting for
their fair share (Salaga & Fort, 2016). A concern is that G5 institutions may have taken resources
away from other groups on campus to fund COA only to remain in the same competitive position
within their conferences. Findings imply that within-conference balance would have been the
same if COA was never introduced and the money invested in COA may have better served G5
athletic programs and their universities in other areas.
In line with policy design theory, COA is an example of a beneficial policy that was
designed and quickly implemented through the autonomy model that effectively maintained the
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Power 5’s advantaged financial status over the Group of Five by pressuring them to spend
money they did not have. The optional nature of the COA policy implies that G5 schools and
conferences had an opportunity to reduce the college athletics arms race by opting out of the
policy, avoiding the associated costs and de-escalating expenditures in NCAA sports. However,
the Matthew Effect suggests that spending will continue to rise because smaller conferences
continue to feel the pressure to compete with larger programs that have more financial resources
(Weight & Zullo, 2015). As a result, they are more likely to try to keep up with or outpace the
spending behaviors displayed by the Power 5 as well as their conference peers (Frank et al.,
2014; Perline & Stoldt, 2007), which perpetuates cumulative advantage in all NCAA sports
(Gurney et al., 2017; Orszag & Orszag, 2005). Because COA impacted P5 and G5 athletic
budgets differently (Ngo et al., 2022), this study provides suggestive evidence that opting into
policies such as COA exacerbate the overall wealth gap in the NCAA while doing little to
contribute to competitive balance at the conference level.
Rather than adopting the rules the Power 5 writes, Group of Five conferences could focus
on conference-level balance instead of trying to compete with Power 5 conferences whose
advantages have accumulated significantly over the years. G5 conferences could then expand to
promote balance between their five conferences. At this time, outside of college football bowl
games, which are typically non-conference matchups, there is nothing beyond the conference
championship for G5 teams to strive for other than NCAA sanctioned playoffs and tournaments
that lead to the national championship. The addition of a Group of Five playoff and
championship for all sports would provide G5 teams with something to work toward beyond the
conference championship that could provide them with more recognition and prestige without
having to compete against resource-advantaged schools for the national title. Although powerless
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in the policy-making process, Group of Five schools have the power to focus on their own
financial and competitive interests by opting out of autonomous policies such as COA and signal
a commitment to de-escalate expenditures which may help quell the college athletics arms race.
Men’s vs Women’s Sports
College sports are contextualized as educationally based, thereby enacting Title IX which
requires “substantially equal” compensation for male and female student-athletes (Carpenter &
Acosta, 2015, p. 69). Without this federal protection, it is very likely that only football and men’s
basketball student-athletes would have received the additional COA compensation; therefore,
COA provides an opportunity to examine how Title IX may continue to influence women’s
collegiate sports by forcing college sport decision-makers to consider female student-athletes in
policies related to financial aid and compensation. Turning to policy design theory, this study
further explored whether women’s sports experienced different changes in competitive balance
following COA compared to positively constructed men’s sports. Findings provide some
suggestive evidence that women’s sports became less balanced following COA (HHI = 576.51; p
= 0.046) relative to men’s sports. This finding is an example of unintended consequences that
may have resulted from the implementation of COA.
Comparing men’s basketball and women’s basketball provided a more direct comparison
between groups to help further understand the differences between positively (men’s) and
negatively (women’s) constructed groups because these two sports have similar schedules and
point structures and were therefore more comparable than other men’s and women’s sports (i.e.,
comparing football to women’s volleyball). These two sports are also the only sports that have
direct male and female counterparts at all DI FBS institutions; because of this, COA impacts
both equally as related to scholarships, because both men’s and women’s basketball are allocated
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13 full scholarships and therefore 13 COA stipends. Men’s and women's basketball experienced
significantly different immediate changes in game closeness the year COA was introduced
(0.01273; p = 0.016), with closer scoring in men’s basketball (-0.00723; p = 0.015) and larger
margins of victory in women’s basketball (0.0055; p = 0.208). These differences were even more
pronounced when comparing game closeness for P5 MBB and P5 WBB (0.02035; p = 0.002).
Because women’s sports likely received the additional stipend because of Title IX
requirements, this decline in balance could be seen as an unintended consequence of Title IX
requiring policies to similarly apply to men’s and women’s sports, both of which have varying
needs. Unintended consequences of Title IX have been documented in previous research,
including the decline and underrepresentation of women coaches and administrators (Massengale
& Lough; Whisenant, 2003; Stangl & Kane, 1991). However, Title IX’s application to equal
scholarship funding is much more straightforward and enforceable than it is to budget
allocations; therefore, policy design theory and the Matthew Effect suggest that women’s sports
may be more adversely affected by policies such as COA because the college arms race is largely
focused on football and men’s basketball spending with schools prioritizing investments in areas
that they believe will make them more revenue.
Although college athletic departments have historically discounted the revenuegenerating potential of women’s sport, the Sports Innovation Lab’s (2021) study entitled “The
Fan Project”, a market research study on the evolution of fan behavior in the sport industry,
revealed that the availability of women’s sport offerings has not kept up with increasing demand,
suggesting that women’s sports has the potential to generate significant revenue in upcoming
years should sport leaders make proper adjustments in marketing, broadcasting, and production.
During the time period of this study, interest in women’s college sports has grown. Viewership
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increased substantially in recent years for NCAA finals and championships in women’s
basketball, softball, volleyball, and gymnastics (Brunt, 2021). At the same time, there has been a
decline in viewership for the NCAA national championship games for football (Hunte, 2021) and
men’s basketball (Young, 2021). Today, women’s sports are still seen as niche sports,
characterized by a lack of mass appeal, less financial support, and less media attention
(Greenhalgh et al., 2011). Perline, Noble, and Stoldt (2018) hypothesized that greater
competitive balance should be prioritized where there is greater potential revenue. Although
men’s sports still attract significantly more viewers and generate higher levels of revenue, key
stakeholders can capitalize on the growing interest in women’s sports to build relationships with
a growing, highly engaged audience (Kelleher, 2019). Competitive balance in women’s sports is
increasingly important as interest is growing and close games are related to fan attendance and
viewership (Coates & Humphreys, 2011). Exciting, competitively balanced matchups and
leagues could help transition women’s sports, especially women’s basketball, from niche to
mainstream, generating significant revenue along the way.
Limitations
This study examined how NCAA policy impacts within-conference competitive balance.
When trying to determine causal inference, there are many data collection and methodological
challenges that arise which result in limitations to the study. First, COA was an optional policy
for schools outside the Power 5; schools had the discretion to choose if and when to adopt it as
well as in which sports to implement it in while considering Title IX requirements. Although
some FBS schools did not adopt the policy immediately, there was an intent to adopt. In each
conference included in this study, over half the schools adopted the first year (2015) and all
remaining schools opted in by the second year (2016) (Ngo et al., 2022). In addition, all schools
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opted in for men’s and women’s basketball, and these two sports offset one another to satisfy
Title IX requirements. All schools also opted into football; however, there is limited information
on which women’s sports each school used to offset the 85 COA stipend distributed to football
student-athletes. This study included two women’s sports that were most likely to have received
the additional COA benefit: women’s soccer and women’s volleyball.
Another limitation to this study was the scope and limited access to data that could have
accounted for more of the error in the model. Data related to women’s collegiate sport outcomes
were limited and difficult to find and aggregate. In contrast, numerous public websites have
consolidated college men’s sport data for easy analysis. Future research in this space would
significantly benefit from more online databases collecting and organizing performance
outcomes for women’s sports.
During the time frame of this study (2008-2020), other policies were passed through the
autonomy model that may have influenced competitive balance including: the revision of Prop
48 in 2016 increasing the academic standards incoming student-athletes were required to meet
(Oriard, 2012); and changes in student-athlete transfer regulations in 2018 allowing more
opportunities for student-athletes to move to a different school during their undergraduate careers
(Hosick, 2018). In addition, one confounding policy that may have affected changes in game
closeness in women’s basketball was the shift from 20-minute halves to a four-quarter format in
2015 (Johnson, 2015). This rule change included changes to the shot clock, fouls and free
throws, and time outs. The intention of the change in game format was to try and improve the
overall fan experience and make games more exciting by increasing the pace of play and scoring
(Rudi, 2015); however, this study shows that balance in WBB decreased. While these findings
suggest that the change in MVR for WBB may be related to COA; further research is warranted

110

to explore potential confounds, such as the change in game format, that may have contributed to
these changes in balance for WBB.
Competitive balance is difficult to quantify and may also be influenced by external
factors, such as student-athletes leaving school early to become a professional athlete, which is
more common in men’s basketball. Finally, this study looked only at Division I FBS
conferences. It is difficult to compare DI FBS conferences to other Division I conferences (i.e.,
Football Championship Subdivision) and even more difficult to compare them to conferences
with Division II or III affiliation; therefore, the interrupted time series model was chosen without
a control group for comparison. Because of these limitations, findings of this study are not
considered causal and rather describe the relationship between COA and competitive balance as
measured by MVR and HHI.
Future Studies
Although competitive balance in college sport is widely talked about, specifically in
justifying various rules and regulations concerning amateurism and pay-for-play, there is still
limited research on how policies hurt or support parity in the NCAA within conferences. In
addition, there is limited research on balance in women’s sports and non-Power 5 men’s sports.
This study attempted to examine competitive balance within sports and conferences and can be
built upon in future studies. As previous research found that COA was associated with
redistributions of revenue within DI FBS athletic programs (Ngo et al., 2022), future research
could continue to examine within-conference balance and determine how revenue and
expenditure shifts related to COA may be related to competitive balance measures such as MVR
and HHI. In addition, qualitative research may provide a richer understanding of how COA
stipends influenced the lived experiences of student-athletes (i.e., well-being, training and travel
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conditions) and how these experiences may influence performance impacting competitive
balance measures.
This study also showed that an increase in compensation for student-athletes had little
effect on conference-level competitive balance when looking at scores and winning. Starting in
the 2021-22 academic year, NCAA student-athletes were able to earn income off their personal
names, images, and likenesses (NIL), introducing a new world of earning potential for studentathletes during their undergraduate careers (Dosh, 2021). An Associated Press survey found that
73% of Division I athletic directors believed that NIL would have a negative impact on
competitive balance (Russo, 2021). Because institutional brand equity plays a role in revenue
generation from sponsorships and media rights (Lawrence, 2013), future studies could attempt to
understand the impact of NIL on various competitive balance measures and revenues.
Furthermore, Title IX will continue to play a role in NIL’s application to college sport. While
many argued that NIL will only help a small subset of male student-athletes and widen the
gender gap in college sport, early NIL deals have already proven the value of female studentathletes (Forde, 2021). Because of Title IX, female student-athletes will have the same
opportunities to earn money as male student-athletes, as was the case with COA and COA
stipends. NIL may allow female student-athletes to cash in on their personal brands and athletic
departments may see increased interest in women’s sport, both of which may have been
suppressed by the historical lack of support from the NCAA.
As previous studies have found a stronger relationship between spending and out-ofconference winning percentages compared to within-conference percentages (Caro & Elder,
2017), future research could also move away from within-conference balance and expand to
understand how policies influence balance across all of the NCAA. The Matthew Effect posits
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that non-elite programs are unable to keep pace with the cumulative advantages accrued by elite
programs. Conversations surrounding competitive balance are typically centered around how a
handful of programs consistently recruit the best players and generate the highest revenues,
resulting in similar players in national championships year after year. The inclusion of nonconference games, including regular season, post-season bowl games, championships, and so
forth could provide a clearer picture of the competitive advantages that positively constructed
conferences may have over negatively constructed conferences in both men’s and women’s
sports. This could also help elaborate the differing levels of competition between various groups
and test hypotheses focused on how modeling budget allocations after elite programs may only
strain non-P5 budgets without doing much to level the playing field. Follow up studies could also
utilize these frameworks to examine how NCAA policies and structures designed by positively
constructed groups may manipulate rankings that contribute to national championships and
rankings.
Conclusion
This study examined whether different groups within the Division I Football Bowl
Subdivision experienced different changes in competitive balance following the introduction of
the cost of attendance policy in 2015. In line with policy design theory, women’s basketball
experienced significantly different and negative changes in balance following COA compared to
men’s basketball. Findings also showed that men’s sports were significantly less balanced
throughout, suggesting that a small number of football and men’s basketball programs dominate
their conferences and are likely to have strong influence in policy decision-making. As the needs
of women’s sports are typically not at the forefront of the policy design process, this change
highlights broader, unintended consequences of COA and Title IX’s requirement that it applies
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equitably to female student-athletes. Both policy design theory and the Matthew Effect help
describe why, even though women received substantially equal scholarships, these policies still
favor elite men’s revenue-generating sports and help the rich get richer because schools attempt
to match increased spending with increased revenues. Competitive balance is increasingly
important for women’s sports because interest is growing (Sports Innovation Lab, 2021; Brunt,
2021) and there is potential to capitalize on this growth and generate significant revenue by
increasing fan attendance and viewership with unpredictable, exciting matchups (Coates &
Humphreys, 2011).
This study also showed that Group of Five schools chose to opt in to COA, and accept the
additional financial implications, only for balance to remain more or less the same. The Matthew
Effect helps explain how Group of Five schools are pressured to keep up with the spending
behaviors displayed by the Power 5 and how this behavior leads to cumulative inequality (Frank,
Levine, and Dijk, 2014) and the arms race in college sport where schools continuously seek to
outspend one another in order to gain a competitive advantage (Gurney et al., 2017; Orszag &
Orszag, 2005). The athletics arms race is evidenced by data showing that between 2008 and
2020, Division I athletic expenditures increased from $4.6 billion to $8.9 billion (Knight
Commission, 2020); average spending at P5 and G5 schools increased from $62.6 million to
$112.5 million and $20.8 million to $50.1 million, respectively. Policy design theory illustrates
how the autonomy model acts as a structure that allows the Power 5 to quickly implement
policies that apply pressure on other DI schools to spend more. Increasing their budgets by
upwards of $1 million to further compensate student-athletes was an easy decision for the Power
5 but less so for Group of Five schools. Still, G5 schools chose to quickly opt in to the policy and
adopt higher spending levels, perpetuating the arms race and cumulative inequality in college
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sport. As a result, COA was not effective in promoting balance; instead, it increased overall
spending levels in NCAA Division I, exacerbated the overall wealth gap and did little to
contribute to competitive balance at the conference level. Although non-P5 conferences do not
have the power that P5 conferences have in Division I policy making, they do have the power to
focus on their own financial and competitive interests by rejecting the policies that come out of
the autonomy model, specifically those that are associated with increased spending. Opting out
of such policies might be an important first step to quelling the college athletics arms race,
controlling escalating expenditures, and focusing on the educational mission of college athletics
while providing exciting, competitive matchups for both student-athletes and the community.
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APPENDIX A
Individual Sport and Conference Interrupted Time Series Results
This appendix consists of the individual interrupted time series regression analyses that
were first conducted for this study. Each sport within each conference (i.e., ACC Football, ACC
Men’s Basketball, etc.) was assigned a value between 1-45 in the dataset and the xtitsa command
in Stata was used to conduct the time series analysis with panel data.
ACC Football
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.00361
p = 0.399

610.119
p = 0.391

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.05313
p = 0.213

1147.321
p = 0.703

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.01802
p = 0.114

-2141.369
p = 0.133

Games

X

1093.65
p = 0.731

95% CI [-0.013, 0.006]

95% CI [-0.1449, 0.039]

95% CI [-0.006, 0.042]

95% CI [-1006.775, 2227.013]

95% CI [-5880.835, 8174.478]

95% CI [-5160.026, 877.2876]

95% CI [-6342.347, 8529.847]

Members

0.01863
p = 0.109

-763.8889
p = 0.928

0.07436
p = 0.555

-10022.32

12

12

95% CI [-0.0053, 0.043]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.201, 0.358]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
ACC Football

0.014416
p = 0.159

95% CI [-0.007, 0.036]

95% CI [-20722.03, 19194.25]

p = 0.855

95% CI [-1389.03.3, 118858.7]

HHI
-1531.25
p = 0.192

95% CI [-4080.356, 1017.856]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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ACC Men’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.00341
p = 0.018**

892.9042
p = 0.040**

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.00521
p = 0.154

-2355.499
p = 0.069*

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.00226
p = 0.305

-507.9007
p = 0.303

Games

X

-293.5593
p = 0.049*

95% CI [0.0008, 0.006]

95% CI [-0.01294, 0.00251]

95% CI [-0.0071, 0.0026]

95% CI [56.935, 1728.873]

95% CI [-4957.89, 246.89]

95% CI [-1611.563, 595.762]

95% CI [-585.042, -2.077]

Members

-0.0044
p = 0.028*

6081.725
p = 0.003**

0.1246
p = 0.000***

-7790.2
p = 0.111

12

12

95% CI [-0.0082, -0.00061]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.0802, 0.168]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
ACC Men’s Basketball

0.00115
p = 0.524

95% CI [-0.0029, 0.0052]

95% CI [2949.56, 9213.89]

95% CI [-17979.81, 2399.412]

HHI
385.0035
p = 0.461

95% CI [-810.43, 1580.44]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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ACC Women’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0051081
p = 0.038*

697.54
p = 0.167

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.01501
p = 0.036*

1354.6
p = 0.222

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.00919
p = 0.008*

-1014.04
p = 0.073

Games

X

-12.806
p = 0.758

95% CI [0.0004, 0.0098]

95% CI [0.0013, 0.0287]

95% CI [-0.0151, -0.0032]

95% CI [-339.27, 16554.34]

95% CI [-1076.229, 3785.431]

95% CI [-2157.13 129.04]

95% CI [-109.9, 84.3]

Members

-0.004351
p = 0.157

2674.47
p = 0.011*

0.1031
p = 0.013*

-5820.614
p = 0.498

12

12

95% CI [-0.0108, 0.0021]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.0289, 0.177]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
ACC Women’s
Basketball

-0.0041
p = 0.029**

95% CI [-0.0076, -0.00056]

95% CI [866.23, 4482.71]

95% CI [-25574.29, 13933.06]

HHI
-406.505
p = 0.171

95% CI [-1045.46, 232.45]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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ACC Women’s Volleyball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.00615
p = 0.787

565.0024
p = 0.459

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.0616
p = 0.143

5364.855
p = 0.324

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.00747
p = 0.751

-1059.836
p = 0.289

Games

X

5.515
p = 0.770

95% CI [-0.058, 0.046]

95% CI [-0.0268, 0.150]

95% CI [-0.061, 0.046]

95% CI [-1182.286, 2312.291]

95% CI [-6858.642, 17578.35]

95% CI [-3290.32, 1170.64]

95% CI [-38.537, 49.55]

Members

0.007654
p = 0.818

912.14
p = 0.648

0.267
p = 0.503

16308.48
p = 0.503

12

12

95% CI [-0.0681, 0.0834]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.628, 1.162]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
ACC Women’s
Volleyball

-0.01367
p = 0.051*

95% CI [-0.027, 0.00005]

95% CI [-3739.94, 5564.21]

95% CI [-39760.99, 72377.95]

HHI
-494.83
p = 0.176

95% CI [-1284.71, 295.04]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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ACC Women’s Soccer
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.02528
p = 0.142

399.74
p = 0.638

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.002281
p = 0.982

3845.637
p = 0.398

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.03487
p = 0.286

-1906.794
p = 0.397

Games

X

-781.14
p = 0.800

95% CI [-0.0614, 0.0108]

95% CI [-0.2296, 0.2341]

95% CI [-0.03849, 0.1062]

95% CI [-1574.87, 2374.35]

95% CI [-6489.12, 14180.39]

95% CI [-7028.43, 3214.84]

95% CI [-1689.92, 127.63]

Members

0.04972
p = 0.048*

8159.39
p = 0.044*

-0.244101
p = 0.330

=29785.04
p = 0.081

12

12

95% CI [0.00059, 0.09884]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.7951, 0.3069]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
ACC Women’s Soccer

0.0095861
p = 0.724

95% CI [-0.05196

95% CI [322.46, 15996.31]

95% CI [-64589.78, 5019.7]

HHI
-1507.052
p = 0.481

95% CI [-6419.73, 3405.63]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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Big 10 Football
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0042783
p = 0.781

1557.44
p = 0.034*

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.02748
p = 0.284

2792.86
p = 0.018*

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.021421
p = 0.298

-2492.91
p = 0.010*

Games

X

-128.24
p = 0.121

95% CI [-0.039, 0.031]

95% CI [-0.02855, 0.08351]

95% CI [-0.02362, 0.0665]

95% CI [167.34, 2947.55]

95% CI [675.76, 4909.85]

95% CI [-4155.14, -830.681]

95% CI [-302.15, 45.67]

Members

0.0045
p = 0.847

1331.442
p = 0.159

0.2832775
p = 0.257

24059.36
p = 0.027*

12

12

95% CI [-0.04874, 0.057756]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.2592, 0.82575]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Big 10 Football

0.0171428
p = 0.196

95% CI [-0.01119, 0.045475]

95% CI [-696.27, 3359.15]

95% CI [3905.695, 44213.02]

HHI
-935.47
p = 0.014**

95% CI [--1606.3, -264.63]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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Big 10 Men’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.00154
p = 0.620

-61.89
p = 0.911

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.00259
p = 0.813

264.23
p = 0.898

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.00069
p = 0.866

-427.03
p = 0.571

Games

X

-75.197
p = 0.197

95% CI [-0.00855, 0.0055]

95% CI [-0.02229, 0.02747]

95% CI [-0.010, 0.008]

95% CI [-1356.62, 1232.95]

95% CI [-4585.016, 5113.48]

95% CI [-2170.15, 1316.09]

95% CI [-202.06, 51.67]

Members

0.00183
p = 0.742

3688.271
p = 0.002*

0.06755
p = 0.277

-443.287
p = 0.963

12

12

95% CI [-0.018, 0.014]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.068, 0.203]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Big 10 Men’s Basketball

-0.00223
p = 0.420

95% CI [-0.0084, 0.0039]

95% CI [1878.51, 5498.03]

95% CI [-22677.06, 21790.49]

HHI
-488.92
p = 0.336

95% CI [-1633.514, 655.68]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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Big 10 Women’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0013
p = 0.435

-32.42
p = 0.956

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.00305
p = 0.766

99.16
p = 0.972

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.00174
p = 0.698

-1532.37
p = 0.196

Games

X

-29.71
p = 0.529

95% CI [-0.005, 0.002]

95% CI [-0.0203, 0.0264]

95% CI [-0.008, 0.12]

95% CI [-1404.54, 1339.7]

95% CI [-64192.07, 6617.39]

95% CI [-4112.52, 1047.78]

95% CI [-138.4, 7901

Members

0.00267
p = 0.473

4112.6
p = 0.008*

0.01518
p = 0.701

-11827.46
p = 0.238

12

12

95% CI [-0.006, 0.011]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.074, 0.105]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Big 10 Women’s
Basketball

0.00045
p = 0.914

95% CI [-0.009, 0.010]

95% CI [1508.37, 6716.83]

95% CI [-33925.14, 10270.23]

HHI
-1564.787
p = 0.119

95% CI [-3670.87, 541.3]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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Big 10 Women’s Volleyball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.00656
p = 0.525

1086.51
p = 0.064

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.0874
p = 0.027*

6408.83
p = 0.001***

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.011897
p = 0.406

-733.68
p = 0.192

Games

X

53.23
p = 0.127

95% CI [-0.017, 0.0298]

95% CI [0.0133, 0.1614]

95% CI [-0.04374, 0.0199]

95% CI [-87.85, 2260.86]

95% CI [3702.5, 9115.16]

95% CI [-1955.999, 388.65]

95% CI [-19.834, 124.3]

Members

-0.02125
p = 0.317

-1514.18
p = 0.204

0.557798
p = 0.032*

44357.12
p = 0.003**

12

12

95% CI [-0.0678, 0.0253]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.0647, 1.051]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Big 10 Women’s
Volleyball

-0.00534

p = 0.581

95% CI [-0.0272, 0.016]

95% CI [-4117.16, 1088.8]

95% CI [21725.97, 66988.26]

HHI
351.83
p = 0.360

95% CI [-518.36, 1224.025]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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Big 10 Women’s Soccer
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.00226
p = 0.775

-962.34
p = 0.180

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.0493
p = 0.119

1749.663
p = 0.100

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.00304
p = 0.844

-219.797
p = 0.746

Games

X

679.24
p = 0.119

95% CI [-0.0202, 0.0157]

95% CI [-0.016, 0.115]

95% CI [-0.038, 0.032]

95% CI [-2513.13, 588.66]

95% CI [-449.499, 3948.825]

95% CI [-1808.228, 1369.64]

95% CI [-234.67, 1593.15]

Members

-0.01546
p = 0.192

-3533.5
p = 0.286

0.46463
p = 0.005**

-10107.09
p = 0.271

12

12

95% CI [-0.0408, 0.0099]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.1954, 0.7338]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Big 10 Women’s
Volleyball

-0.0053
p = 0.692

95% CI [-0.0357, 0.025]

95% CI [-10922.73, 3855.76]

95% CI [-30521, 10305.82]

HHI
-1182.036
p = 0.000***

95% CI [-1546.341, -817.73]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

134

135

Big 12 Football
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.01556
p = 0.025*

-22.08
p = 0.985

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.068589
p = 0.351

441.152
p = 0.917

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.07296
p = 0.013*

-584.193
p = 0.531

Games

X

182.92
p = 0.811

95% CI [0.0025, 0.0286]

95% CI [-0.0937, 0.231]

95% CI [-0.125, -0.021]

95% CI [-2726.85, 2682.69]

95% CI [-9500.561, 10382.86]

95% CI [-2737.01, 1568.62]

95% CI [-1606.674, 1972.52]

Members

0.0402
p = 0.035*

2610.414
p = 0.365

-0.15569
p = 0.424

-4117.577
p = 0.824

12

12

95% CI [0.004, 0.0766]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.589, 0.278]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Big 12 Football

-0.0574
p = 0.032**

95% CI [-0.1081, -0.0067]

95% CI [-3908.65, 9129.48]

95% CI [-47517.49, 39282.34]

HHI
-606.275
p = 0.223

95% CI [-1697.19, 484.64]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

136

137

Big 12 Men’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.002155
p = 0.121

-1106.736
p = 0.000***

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.0171
p = 0.220

2645.473
p = 0.005**

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.0077
p = 0.123

349.415
p = 0.488

Games

X

-448.351
p = 0.110

95% CI [-0.005, 0.0007]

95% CI [-0.047, 0.013]

95% CI [-0.003, 0.018]

95% CI [-1442.62, -770.86]

95% CI [1136.35, 4154.596]

95% CI [-808.8003, 1507.63]

95% CI [-1033.8, 137.1]

Members

-0.00686
p = 0.079

3185.236
p = 0.027*

0.16404
p = 0.004**

49192.95
p = 0.018*

12

12

95% CI [-0.015, 0.001]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.0699, 0.258]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Big 12 Men’s Basketball

0.0055
p = 0.230

95% CI [-0.004, 0.015]

95% CI [517.3, 5853.18]

95% CI [12005.38, 86380.51]

HHI
-7578.32
p = 0.157

95% CI [-1904.8, 390.13]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

138

139

Big 12 Women’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.00075
p = 0.820

-631.76
p = 0.204

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.01961
p = 0.119

2705.248
p = 0.091

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.00368
p = 0.392

476.1
p = 0.468

Games

X

81.47
p = 0.503

95% CI [-0.008, 0.007]

95% CI [-0.007, 0.046]

95% CI [-0.006, 0.013]

95% CI [-1716.56, 453.03]

95% CI [-586.324, 5996.82]

95% CI [-1028.18, 1980.38]

95% CI [-198.36, 361.3]

Members

0.000244
p = 0.966

1530.95
p = 0.169

0.0526
p = 0.460

11532.38
p = 0.058

12

12

95% CI [-0.013, 0.013]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.107, 0.212]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Big 12 Women’s
Basketball

0.0029
p = 0.278

95% CI [-0.003, 0.009]

95% CI [-867.28, 3929.18]

95% CI [-554.35, 236.19.11]

HHI
-155.67
p = 0.511

95% CI [-700.7, 389.12]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

140

141

Big 12 Women’s Volleyball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.01538
p = 0.252

-1200.447
p = 0.010*

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.07008
p = 0.101

1147.61
p = 0.582

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0028
p = 0.854

916.81
p = 0.401

Games

X

290.08
p = 0.001***

95% CI [-0.014, 0.045]

95% CI [-0.158, 0.018]

95% CI [-0.038,.. 0.032]

95% CI [-1997.77, -403.12]

95% CI [-3676.06, 5971.271]

95% CI [-1652.96, 3396.58]

95% CI [184.88, 395.29]

Members

0.0282
p = 0.425

-2366.464
p = 0.001***

0.01736
p = 0.966

33915.51
p = 0.004**

12

12

95% CI [-0.051, 0.107]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.917 ,0.951]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Big 12 Women’s
Volleyball

0.0125
p = 0.180

95% CI [-0.007, 0.032]

95% CI [-3363.334. -1369.59]

95% CI [16053.09, 51777.93]

HHI
-283.64
p = 0.773

95% CI [-2583.87, 2016.59]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

142

143

Big 12 Women’s Soccer
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0256
p = 0.398

-861.404
p = 0.260

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.14547
p = 0.165

-2638.5
p = 0.389

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0043
p = 0.903

2626.95
p = 0.044*

Games

X

280.13
p = 0.034*

95% CI [-0.042, 0.093]

95% CI [-0.3676, 0.0767]

95% CI [-0.084, 0.076]

95% CI [-3555.04, 833.23]

95% CI [-9591.45, 4313.5]

95% CI [10087, 5153.03]

95% CI [2847, 531.79]

Members

0.03042
p = 0.643

-6996.65
p = 0.005**

-0.1249
p = 0.875

76564.02
p = 0.000***

12

12

95% CI [-0.118, 0.179]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-1.93, 1.68]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Big 12 Women’s Soccer

0.02129
p = 0.281

95% CI [-0.0218, 0.0644]

95% CI [-10963.36, -3029.932]

95% CI [57436.3 95690.73]

HHI
1765.544
p = 0.066*

95% CI [-163.36, 3694.44]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

144

145

PAC 12 Football
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0374
p = 0.010*

-308.64
p = 0.318

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.06495
p = 0.036*

1200.82
p = 0.408

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.03972
p = 0.011*

-53086
p = 0.329

Games

X

-2016.46
p = 0.039*

95% CI [-0.06242, -0.01237]

95% CI [0.0068, 0.1241]

95% CI [0.0126, 0.0669]

95% CI [-1001.73, 384.44]

95% CI [-2104.981, 4506.63]

95% CI [-1752.82, 691.09]

95% CI [-3894.47, -138.45]

Members

0.03234
p = 0.169

13765.43
p = 0.021*

0.094235
p = 0.664

-14794.24
p = 0.173

12

12

95% CI [-0.0175, 0.0822]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.398, 0.586]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Pac 12 Football

0.002324
p = 0.617

95% CI [-0.0082, 0.0128]

95% CI [2958.46, 24572.4]

95% CI [-38224.13, 8635.65]

HHI
-839.51
p = 0.087*

95% CI [-1845.89, 166.87]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

146

147

Pac 12 Men’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0019
p = 0.673

-291.01
p = 0.475

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.00827
p = 0.549

2447.58
p = 0.359

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.00169
p = 0.724

-410.55
p = 0.674

Games

X

195.54
p = 0.409

95% CI [-0.008, 0.012]

95% CI [-0.039, 0.023]

95% CI [-0.013, 0.0092]

95% CI [-1226.27, 644.26]

95% CI [-3585.04, 8480.21]

95% CI [-2683.866, 1862.774]

95% CI [-344.22, 735.31]

Members

-0.001239
p = 0.898

1864.849
p = 0.483

0.0907

p = 0.349

-10778.69
p = 0.281

12

12

95% CI [-0.023, 0.020]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.123, 0.305]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Pac 12 Men’s Basketball

0.0002
p = 0.880

95% CI [-0.003, 0.004]

95% CI [-4244.789, 7974.486]

95% CI [-33029.81, 11472.43]

HHI
-701.55
p = 0.439

95% CI [-2775.212, 1362.11]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

148

149

Pac 12 Women’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.00216
p = 0.627

-123.46
p = 0.806

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.01501
p = 0.202

1172.182
p = 0.305

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.00401
p = 0.410

68.08
p = 0.893

Games

X

-77.144
p = 0.557

95% CI [-0.012, 0.008]

95% CI [-0.0102, 0.0402]

95% CI [-0.007, 0.015]

95% CI [-1297.56, 1050.64]

95% CI [-1387.75, 3732.11]

95% CI [-1119.479, 1255.632]

95% CI [-380.93, 226.64]

Members

-0.006
p = 0.467

3611.437
p = 0.131

0.1357
p = 0.118

-4253.31
p = 0.805

12

12

95% CI [-0.025, 0.012]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.044, 0.316]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Pac 12 Women’s
Basketball

0.00185
p = 0.313

95% CI [-0.002, 0.006]

95% CI [-1442.82, 8665.7]

95% CI [-44690, 36183.38]

HHI
-55.383
p = 0.698

95% CI [-388.65, 277.88]d

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

150

151

Pac 12 Women’s Volleyball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.03622
p = 0.003**

706.63
p = 0.553

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.031902
p = 0.248

-693.46
p = 0.772

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.03542
p = 0.036*

-1089.42
p = 0.467

Games

X

1.69
p = 0.978

95% CI [-0.055, -0.018]

95% CI [-0.03, 0.09]

95% CI [0.003, 0.068]

95% CI [-2046.77, 3460.24]

95% CI [-6298.95, 4912.03]

95% CI [-4526.32, 2347.48]

95% CI [-140, 143.4]

Members

0.043714
p = 0.105

1225.127
p = 0.667

0.00506

p = 0.984

15550.09
p = 0.579

12

12

95% CI [-0.012, 0.0992]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.584, 0.595]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Pac 12 Women’s
Volleyball

-0.000805

p = 0.945

95% CI [-0.027, 0.026]

95% CI [05417.62, 7869.9]

95% CI [-49387.45, 80497.62]

HHI
-382.683
p = 0.648

95% CI [-2334.19, 1568.823]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

152

153

Pac 12 Women’s Soccer
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0363
p = 0.051

-356.75
p = 0.842

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.09057
p = 0.156

266.88
p = 0.961

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.0496
p = 0.050*

1024.33
p = 0.602

Games

X

-43.29
p = 0.896

95% CI [-0.073, 0.0003]

95% CI [-0.044, 0.225]

95% CI [-0.000, 0.099]

95% CI [-4547.4, 3833.9]

95% CI [-12613.14, 13146.9]

95% CI [-3527.75, 5576.42]

95% CI [-820.55, 733.97]

Members

0.0372
p = 0.217

1928.612
p = 0.792

0.0197
p = 0.945

9405.882
p = 0.843

12

12

95% CI [-0.028, 0.102]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.626, 0.665]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Pac 12 Women’s Soccer

0.0133
p = 0.380

95% CI [-0.02, 0.05]

95% CI [-15183.99, 19041.21]

95% CI [-102227.7, 121039.5]

HHI
667.5839
p = 0.291

95% CI [-753.48, 2088.65]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

154

155

SEC Football
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.02146
p = 0.404

469.73
p = 0.693

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.06412
p = 0.249

-4047.52
p = 0.303

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.00455
p = 0.858

196.48
p = 0.883

Games

X

1150.41
p = 0.378

95% CI [-0.036, 0.079]

95% CI [-0.185, 0.056]

95% CI [-0.062, 0.053]

95% CI [-2307.49, 3246.295]

95% CI [-12839.52, 4744.48]

95% CI [-2930.42, 3323.37]

95% CI [-1805.63, 4106.445]

Members

-0.00449
p = 0.482

-2069.58
p = 0.745

0.8562
p = 0.269

6535.249
p = 0.840

12

12

95% CI [-0.188, 0.098]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.83, 2.54]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
SEC Football

0.0169
p = 0.003**

95% CI [0.008, 0.026]

95% CI [-16936.19, 12797.04]

95% CI [-69168.66, 82239.16]

HHI
666.2092
p = 0.306

95% CI [-789.36, 2121.78]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

156

157

SEC Men’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.00043
p = 0.917

426.04
p = 0.014*

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.0075
p = 0.467

-1971.413
p = 0.214

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.00063
p = 0.881

-43.32
p = 0.953

Games

X

146.921
p = 0.000***

95% CI [-0.009, 0.01]

95% CI [-0.03, 0.02]

95% CI [-0.01, 0.01]

95% CI [115.56, 736.51]

95% CI [-5380.423, 1437.6]

95% CI [-1736.934, 1650.3]

95% CI [95.2, 198.64]

Members

0.0031
p = 0.736

X

0.0388
p = 0.719

19748.7
p = 0.000***

12

12

95% CI [-0.02, 0.02]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.21, 0.28]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
SEC Men’s Basketball

-0.0002
p = 0.790

95% CI [-0.002, 0.002]

95% CI [14597.5,, 24899.91]

HHI
382.72
p = 0.604

95% CI [-1282.12, 2047.63]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

158

159

SEC Women’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0035
p = 0.442

280.75
p = 0.535

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.003
p = 0.778

-390.02
p = 0.756

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.006
p = 0.298

152.99
p = 0.748

Games

X

47.23
p = 0.489

95% CI [-0.007, 0.013]

95% CI [-0.027, 0.021]

95% CI [-0.017, 0.006]

95% CI [-764.4, 1324.9]

95% CI [-3326.69, 2547.65]

95% CI [-958.73, 1264.72]

95% CI [-109.61, 204.07)

Members

-0.0075
p = 0.530

2146.76
p = 0.128

0.1393
p = 0.325

4693.87
p = 0.647

12

12

95% CI [-0.034, 0.019]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.172, 0.451]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
SEC Women’s Basketball

-0.00217
p = 0.441

95% CI [-0.008, 0.004]

95% CI [-827.9, 5121.5]

95% CI [-19110.18, 28497.93]

HHI
433.74
p = 0.181

95% CI [-267.82, 1135.31]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

160

161

SEC Women’s Volleyball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0163
p = 0.226

1541.62
p = 0.129

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.0196
p = 0.521

-386.71
p = 0.860

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0272
p = 0.090

-2044.99
p = 0.095

Games

X

-34.29
p = 0.045*

95% CI [-0.013, 0.045]

95% CI [-0.088, 0.049]

95% CI [-0.06, 0.005]

95% CI [-600.85, 3684.09]

95% CI [-5508.15, 4734.72]

95% CI [-4571.54, 481.56]

95% CI [-67.59, -0.995]

Members

-0.0384
p = 0.175

-274.9
p = 0.899

0.80912
p = 0.029*

39665.04
p = 0.156

12

12

95% CI [-0.0984, 0.0217

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.109, 1.51]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
SEC Women’s Volleyball

-0.011
p = 0.127

95% CI [-0.03, 0.004]

95% CI [-5339.44, 4789.64]

95% CI [-20146.59, 99476.67

HHI
-503.3713
p = 0.229

95% CI [-1423.627, 416.88]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

162

163

SEC Women’s Soccer
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0111
p = 0.410

-1016.73
p = 0.382

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.0158
p = 0.760

-4025.053
p = 0.253

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.01997
p = 0.303

1143.954
p = 0.433

Games

X

-467.86
p = 0.048*

95% CI [-0.041, 0.019]

95% CI [-0.102, 0.133]

95% CI [-0.022, 0.062]

95% CI [-3652.98, 1618.52]

95% CI [-11806.7, 3756.59]

95% CI [-2187.898, 4475.81]

95% CI [-929.25, -6.67]

Members

0.00756
p = 0.792

7527.19
p = 0.044*

0.1941
p = 0.568

-10428.32
p = 0.584

12

12

95% CI [-0.058, 0.073]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.571, 0.959]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
SEC Women’s Soccer

0.00883
p = 0.509

95% CI [-0.021, 0.039]

95% CI [272.956, 14781.42]

95% CI [-54541.37, 33684.72]

HHI
127.2244
p = 0.883

95% CI [-1895.764, 2150.213]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

164

165

CUSA Football
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0021
p = 0.851

-327.11
p = 0.557

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.0104
p = 0.866

1081.17
p = 0.701

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0000612
p = 0.997

-860.39
p = 0.428

Games

X

1744.792
p = 0.027*

95% CI [-0.03, 0.02]

95% CI [-0.13, 0.15]

95% CI [-0.037, 0.037]

95% CI [-1614.17, 959.95]

95% CI [-5490.312, 7652.65]

95% CI [-3335.265, 1614.49]

95% CI [279.18, 3210.41]

Members

0.12757
p = 0.450

-1228.22
p = 0.401

0.15061
p = 0.467

-32382.78
p = 0.101

12

12

95% CI [-0.025, 0.05]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.312, 0.613]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
CUSA Football

-0.00217
p = 0.856

95% CI [-0.029, 0.025]

95% CI [-4557.67, 2101.227]

95% CI [-73367.86, 8602.31]

HHI
-1187.5
p = 0.218

95% CI [-3301.38, 926.38]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

166

167

CUSA Men’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.00142
p = 0.382

-468.75
p = 0.387

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.00364
p = 0.689

1814.431
p = 0.248

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.0008
p = 0.792

-327.55
p = 0.641

Games

X

-25.95
p = 0.811

95% CI [-0.005, 0.002]

95% CI [-0.243, 0.017]

95% CI [-0.006, 0.007]

95% CI [-1698.997, 761.5]

95% CI [-1655.64, 5284.5]

95% CI [-1963.03, 1307.94]

95% CI [-280.44, 228.55]

Members

0.0042
p = 0.024*

3738.813
p = 0.000***

0.02973
p = 0.136

-5953.125
p = 0.338

12

12

95% CI [-0.0007, 0.0076]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.012, 0.072]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
CUSA Men’s Basketball

-0.00063
p = 0.804

95% CI [-0.006, 0.005]

95% CI [2876.56, 4601.07]

95% CI [-19869.53, 7963.28]

HHI
-796.3
p = 0.121

95% CI [-1873.94, 281.34]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

168

169

CUSA Women’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.00115
p = 0.784

-330.5
p = 0.190

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.006
p = 0.705

-373.05
p = 0.776

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.007
p = 0.243

303.6352
p = 0.420

Games

X

247.06
p = 0.336

95% CI [-0.008, 0.011]

95% CI [-0.043, 0.03]

95% CI [-0.006, 0.02]

95% CI [-877.99, 216.99]

95% CI [-3434.82, 2699.73]

95% CI [-544.20, 1161.47]

95% CI [-330.98, 825.1]

Members

-0.0012
p = 0.747

1897.98
p = 0.019*

0.056
p = 0.206

-4840.764
p = 0.438

12

12

95% CI [-0.01, 0.007]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.039, 0.15]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
CUSA Women’s
Basketball

0.008
p = 0.063

95% CI [-0.0006, 0.017]

95% CI [435.33, 3360.63]

95% CI [-19116.96, 9435.437]

HHI
-26.86
p = 0.946

95% CI [-961.42, 907.69]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

170

171

CUSA Women’s Volleyball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0088
p = 0.228

684.383
p = 0.447

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.086
p = 0.220

-3505.06
p = 0.342

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.01062
p = 0.739

349.17
p = 0.749

Games

X

43.48
p = 0.162

95% CI [-0.025, 0.007]

95% CI [-0.065, 0,237]

95% CI [-0.062, 0.083]

95% CI [-1372.323, 2741.09]

95% CI [-11912.24, 4802.13]

95% CI [-2196.64, 2894.98]

95% CI [-23.19, 109.95]

Members

0.00693
p = 0.463

-626.84
p = 0.509

0.244
p = 0.057

35131.13
p = 0.010*

12

12

95% CI [-0.014, 0.028]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.009, 0.498]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
CUSA Women’s
Volleyball

0.001821
p = 0.953

95% CI [-0.069, 0.073]

95% CI [-2809.9, 1556.3]

95% CI [12280.85, 59981.41]

HHI
1033.551
p = 0.165

95% CI [-568.42, 2635.52]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

172

173

CUSA Women’s Soccer
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0249
p = 0.004**

-13.9
p = 0.976

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.09029
p = 0.014*

1132.329
p = 0.628

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.01304
p = 0.168

130.1
p = 0.772

Games

X

-124.7
p = 0.561

95% CI [-0.039, 0.011]

95% CI [0.024, 0.156]

95% CI [-0.007, 0.033]

95% CI [-1114.997, 1087.2]

95% CI [-4292.642, 6557.3]

95% CI [-919.168, 1179.38]

95% CI [-620.54, 371.13]

Members

0.01659
p = 0.069

-414.63
p = 0.419

0.1489
p = 0.152

39808.38
p = 0.063

12

12

95% CI [-0.002, 0.035]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.07, 0.268]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
CUSA Women’s Soccer

-0.0119
p = 0.087

95% CI [-0.026, 0.002]

95% CI [-1584.113, 754.85]

95% CI [-2920.87, 82537.63]

HHI
116.2
p = 0.743

95% CI [-712.96, 945.36]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

174

175

MAC Football
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.00804
p = 0.570

-20.23
p = 0.985

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.00829
p = 0.891

0449.94
p = 0.918

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.00776
p = 0.674

-407.16
p = 0.765

Games

X

1028.27
p = 0.132

95% CI [-0.0399, 0.024]

95% CI [-0.15, 0.13]

95% CI [-0.034, 0.05]

95% CI [-2598.55, 2558.09]

95% CI [-10481.74, 9599.85]

95% CI [-3594.27, 277996]

95% CI [-415.16, 2471.7]

Members

0.02787
p = 0.067

385.205
p = 0.748

-0.0158
p = 0.918

-16600.81
p = 0.619

12

12

95% CI [-0.0026, 0.058]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.365, 0.333]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
MAC Football

-0.0003
p = 0.982

95% CI [-0.027, 0.027]

95% CI [2412.26, 3182.67]

95% CI [-94122.97, 60921.36]

HHI
-427.386
p = 0.608

95% CI [-2361.097, 1506.33]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

176

177

MAC Men’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0023
p = 0.039*

805.9
p = 0.011*

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.007524
p = 0.119

-1960.864
p = 0.011*

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.00106
p = 0.536

-410.84
p = 0.380

Games

X

-295.25
p = 0.000***

95% CI [-0.004, 0.0002]

95% CI [-0.002, 0.018]

95% CI [-0.003, 0.005]

95% CI [264.93, 1346.87]

95% CI [-3278.03, -643.7]

95% CI [-1472.97, 651.3]

95% CI [-400.41, -190.09]

Members

-0.0014
p = 0.217

-288.6
p = 0.185

0.10238
p = 0.000***

63505.56
p = 0.000***

12

12

95% CI [-0.004, 0.001]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.075, 0.13]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
MAC Men’s Basketball

-0.00135
p = 0.387

95% CI [-0.004, 0.002]

95% CI [-601.94, 144.75]

95% CI [50114.29, 76896.82]

HHI
395.06
p = 0.331

95% CI [-518.98, 1309.107]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

178

179

MAC Women’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0054
p = 0.327

-26.69
p = 0.944

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.019
p = 0.390

-372.59
p = 0.807

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.006
p = 0.278

247.96
p = 0.571

Games

X

-51.97
p = 0.722

95% CI [-0.007, 0.017]

95% CI [-0.068, 0.03]

95% CI [-0.019, 0.006]

95% CI [-918.05, 864.66]

95% CI [-3934.87, 3189.69]

95% CI [-763.85, 1259.77]

95% CI [-392.61, 288.67]

Members

-0.006
p = 0.388

54.03
p = 0.923

0.11442
p = 0.175

36020.88
p = 0.038*

12

12

95% CI [-0.022, 0.009]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.065, 0.293]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
MAC Women’s
Basketball

-0.00102
p = 0.609

95% CI [-0.0055, 0.0035]

95% CI [-1255.94, 1363.99]

95% CI [2764.64, 60257.13]

HHI
221.2705
p = 0.296

95% CI [-251.48, 694.02]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

180

181

MAC Women’s Volleyball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.03028

p = 0.056

-1132.336
p = 0.024*

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.127289
p = 0.029*

6057.54
p = 0.002**

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0083608
p = 0.614

-305.08
p = 0.518

Games

X

7.211
p = 0.455

95% CI [-0.062, 0.001]

95% CI [0.018, 0.238]

95% CI [-0.046, 0.029]

95% CI [-2053.95, -2101.72]

95% CI [3203.4, 8911.68]

95% CI [-1392.7, 782.5]

95% CI [-14.87, 29.3]

Members

0.01283
p = 0.348

720.59
p = 0.084

0.2544
p = 0.131

26419.34
p = 0.001***

12

12

95% CI [-0.017, 0.043]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.098, 0.607]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
MAC Women’s
Volleyball

-0.03864
p = 0.003**

95% CI [-0.059, -0.018]

95% CI [-131.84, 1573.031]

95% CI [16323.47, 36515.21]

HHI
-1437.421
p = 0.001***

95% CI [-1961.359, -913.48]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

182

183

MAC Women’s Soccer
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.01917

p = 0.022*

783.95
p = 0.195

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.06933
p = 0.187

-2290.93
p = 0.081

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0293
p = 0.072

-774.43
p = 0.409

Games

X

-50.46
p = 0.938

95% CI [0.004, 0.035]

95% CI [-0.181, 0.043]

95% CI [-0.062, 0.003]

95% CI [-530.77, 2098.67]

95% CI [-4963.43, 381.57]

95% CI [-2909.64, 1360.781]

95% CI [-1573.325, 1472.396]

Members

-0.019188
p = 0.029*

168.78
p = 0.598

0.48765
p = 0.001***

24164.63
p = 0.669

12

12

95% CI [-0.036, -0.003]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.278, 0.697]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
MAC Women’s Soccer

-0.01012
p = 0.433

95% CI [-0.039, 0.019]

95% CI [-574.09, 911.66]

95% CI [-107612.5, 155941.8]

HHI
9.521
p = 0.986

95% CI [-1224.122, 1243.165]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

184

185

MWC Football
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.026
p = 0.010*

-30.97
p = 0.924

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.0601
p = 0.089

-3730.17
p = 0.433

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.0225
p = 0.047*

532.897
p = 0.663

Games

X

478.37
p = 0.172

95% CI [-0.044, -0.008]

95% CI [-0.012, 0.132]

95% CI [0.0004, 0.0045]

95% CI [-795.8, 733.85]

95% CI [-14586.54, 7126.2]

95% CI [-2313.229, 3379.02]

95% CI [-275.97, 1232.71]

Members

-0.0106
p = 0.364

473.47
p = 0.843

0.5437
p = 0.001***

10213.03
p = 0.405

12

12

95% CI [-0.036, 0.015]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.318, 0.77]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
MWC Football

-0.0035
p = 0.550

95% CI [-0.012, 0.001]

95% CI [-5143.55, 6090.49]

95% CI [-17699.45, 38125.52]

HHI
501.924
p = 0.668

95% CI [-2225.888, 3229.736]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

186

187

MWC Men’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0014
p = 0.449

-544.85
p = 0.151

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.0161
p = 0.233

-1198.59
p = 0.231

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.00802
p = 0.055

1344.075
p = 0.011*

Games

X

387.39
p = 0.529

95% CI [-0.006, 0.003]

95% CI [-0.045, 0.013]

95% CI [-0.0002, 0.0163]

95% CI [-1379.89, 270.18]

95% CI [-3399.86, 1002.68]

95% CI [440.03, 2249.92]

95% CI [-1032.78, 1807.56]

Members

0.00105
p = 0.821

-1721.633
p = 0.848

0.0841
p = 0.067

16600.82
p = 0.655

12

12

95% CI [-0.009, 0.012]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.008, 0.176]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
MWC Men’s Basketball

0.0066
p = 0.064

95% CI [-0.0005, 0.0137]

95% CI [-22727.61, 19284.35]

95% CI [-69932.66, 103134.3]

HHI
790.124
p = 0.002**

95% CI [418.32, 1161.93]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

188

189

MWC Women’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0016
p = 0.255

-39.29
p = 0.877

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.0011
p = 0.747

751.11]
p = 0.499

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0011
p = 0.550

-349.48
p = 0.371

Games

X

53.65
p = 0.305

95% CI [-0.005, 0.001]

95% CI [-0.007, 0.009]

95% CI [-0.005, 0.003]

95% CI [-633.91, 555.3]

95% CI [-1805.531, 3307.76]

95% CI [-1233.79, 534.84]

95% CI [-63.55, 170.84]

Members

-0.0033
p = 0.221

1993.181
p = 0.023*

0.0969
p = 0.002**

7293.83
p = 0.139

12

12

95% CI [-0.009, 0.003]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.047, 0.147]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
MWC Women’s
Basketball

0.0027
p = 0.039*

95% CI [-0.005, 0.0002]

95% CI [380.68, 3605.68]

95% CI [-3173.26, 17760.91]

HHI
-388.77
p = 0.225

95% CI [-1091.69, 314.15]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

190

191

MWC Women’s Volleyball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0399
p = 0.339

-53.84
p = 0.931

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.00211
p = 0.976

5067.356
p = 0.185

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0831
p = 0.078

-1082.45
p = 0.182

Games

X

-2.965
p = 0.806

95% CI [-0.052, 0.132]

95% CI [-0.161, 0.165]

95% CI [-0.178, 0.012]

95% CI [-1523.359, 1415.67]

95% CI [-3223.24, 13357.95]

95% CI [-2837.55, 672.65]

95% CI [-31.24, 35.31]

Members

-0.0483
p = 0.259

1290.774
p = 0.390

0.62818
p = 0.039*

16546.46
p = 0.223

12

12

95% CI [-0.141, 0.045]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.043, 1.213]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
MWC Women’s
Volleyball

-0.0432
p = 0.004**

95% CI [-0.068, -0.018]

95% CI [-2119.15, 4700.7]

95% CI [-13214.45, 46307.37]

HHI
-1136.296
p = 0.035*

95% CI [-2160.996, -111.6]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

192

193

MWC Women’s Soccer
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0118
p = 0.381

-16.133
p = 0.986

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.0107
p = 0.015*

4699.9
p = 0.229

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0156
p = 0.365

-1950.1
p = 0.086

Games

X

-360.11
p = 0.219

95% CI [-0.018, 0.041]

95% CI [-0.185, -0.028]

95% CI [-0.054, 0.023]

95% CI [-2130.61, 2098.34]

95% CI [-3891.87, 13291.67]

95% CI [-4276.49, 376.29]

95% CI [-1001.5, 281.3]

Members

-0.01267
p = 0.512

7115.164
p = 0.121

0.4301
p = 0.029*

-18228.61
p = 0.381

12

12

95% CI [-0.056, 0.031]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [0.0597, 0.8004]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
MWC Women’s Soccer

-0.0388
p = 0.713

95% CI [-0.028, 0.02]

95% CI [-2523.09, 16753.42]

95% CI [-65415.01, 28957.8]

HHI
-1966.233
p = 0.003**

95% CI [-2936.315, -996.15]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

194

195

Sun Belt Football
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0408
p = 0.139

3302.232
p = 0.054

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.0025
p = 0.979

-6966.697
p = 0.034*

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.068
p = 0.147

-5393.39
p = 0.040*

Games

X

249.6
p = 0.294

95% CI [-0.017, 0.099]

95% CI [-0.214, 0.209]

95% CI [-0.168, 0.031]

95% CI [-80.85, 6685.32]

95% CI [-13211.25, -722.14]

95% CI [-10433.44, -353.34]

95% CI [-278.64, 771.84]

Members

0.07834
p = 0.174

5784.26
p = 0.040*

-0.7742
p = 0.288

-56660.21
p = 0.052

12

12

95% CI [-0.044, 0.201]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-2.367, 0.8186]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Sun Belt Football

-0.0277
p = 0.312

95% CI [-0.088, 0.032]

95% CI [373.86, 11194.66]

95% CI [-113931.2, 610.818]

HHI
-2091.161
p = 0.032*

95% CI [-3928.944, -253.38]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001

196

197

Sun Belt Men’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0013
p = 0.944

-422.98
p = 0.107

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.0032
p = 0.631

1092.64
p = 0.257

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0001
p = 0.788

118.57
p = 0.731

Games

X

10.511
p = 0.748

95% CI [-0.004, 0.004]

95% CI [-0.019, 0.012]

95% CI [-0.009, 0.007]

95% CI [-969.95, 124.0]

95% CI [-1044.44, 3229.71]

95% CI [-688.15, 925.29]

95% CI [-65.91, 86.93]

Members

-0.00386
p = 0.473

2307.018
p = 0.002**

0.121
p = 0.111

6925.263
p = 0.226

12

12

95% CI [-0.016, 0.008]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.036, 0.278]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Sun Belt Men’s
Basketball

-0.0011
p = 0.635

95% CI [-0.007, 0.004]

95% CI [1181.018, 3433.017]

95% CI [-5606.719, 19456.24]

HHI
-304.402
p = 0.103

95% CI [-692.63, 83.82]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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Sun Belt Women’s Basketball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0042
p = 0.113

621.0003
p = 0.032*

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.0126
p = 0.174

-2244.072
p = 0.085

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.00626
p = 0.253

-1328.48
p = 0.016*

Games

X

148.04
p = 0.010*

95% CI [-0.001,1 0.001]

95% CI [-0.032, 0.007]

95% CI [-0.018, 0.006]

95% CI [74.58, 1167.42]

95% CI [-4905.91, 417.77]

95% CI [-2307.72, -349.25]

95% CI [51.42, 244.67]

Members

0.0129
p = 0.031*

3849.641
p = 0.000***

-0.109
p = 0.122

-23826.25
p = 0.005**

12

12

95% CI [0.002, 0.024]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.256, 0.038]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Sun Belt Women’s
Basketball

-0.00203
p = 0.574

95% CI [-0.0102, 0.006]

95% CI [2738.23, 4961.05]

95% CI [-37199.4, -10453.09]

HHI
-707.49
p = 0.056

95% CI [-1441.56, 26.6]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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201

Sun Belt Women’s Volleyball
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

-0.0061
p = 0.720

-2590.21
p = 0.009**

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

0.0899
p = 0.398

7039.43
p = 0.039*

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

-0.0199
p = 0.493

3250.023
p = 0.055

Games

X

-16.37
p = 0.685

95% CI [-0.045, 0.033]

95% CI [-0.097, 0.217]

95% CI [-0.085, 0.045]

95% CI [-4257.17, -923.25]

95% CI [476.21, 13602.65]

95% CI [-97.5, 6597.55]

95% CI [-110.47, 77.74]

Members

0.0365
p = 0.207

-1786.752
p = 0.124

-0.0393
p = 0.914

64400.99
p = 0.003**

12

12

95% CI [-0.0255, 0.098]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.871, 0.792]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Sun Belt Women’s
Volleyball

-0.0259
p = 0.172

95% CI [-0.066, 0.014]

95% CI [-4229.26, 655.76]

95% CI [31303.8, 97498.18]

HHI
659.81
p = 0.526

95% CI [-1736.62, 3056.25]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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203

Sun Belt Women’s Soccer
MVR

HHI

Years since start of panel
(pre-treatment trajectory)

0.0028
p = 0.868

-287.512
p = 0.659

Post-COA dummy
(change in levelimmediate treatment
effect)

-0.051
p = 0.454

-3764.83
p = 0.311

Years post-COA dummy
(change in slopetreatment effect over
time)

0.005
p = 0.834

725.8
p = 0.484

Games

X

-422.046
p = 0.024*

95% CI [-0.036, 0.041]

95% CI [-0.203, 0.102]

95% CI [-0.049, 0.059]

95% CI [-1801.99, 122697]

95% CI [-12096.72, 4567.07]

95% CI [-1656.26, 3107.87]

95% CI [-768.04, -76.05]

Members

-0.0027
p = 0.925

1921.997
p = 0.388

0.3444
p = 0.380

42363.42
p = 0.024*

12

12

95% CI [-0.068, 0.063]

Baseline Level (B0)

95% CI [-0.524, 1.213]

Observations

Post Intervention Linear Trend Output
MVR
Sun Belt Women’s Soccer

0.0078
p = 0.493

95% CI [-0.0177, 0.0333]

95% CI [-3130.01, 6974.004]

95% CI [7978.689, 76748.15]

HHI
438.2915
p = 0.395

95% CI [-731.29, 1607.87]

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p <0.001
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